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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(j) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Defendants agree with Plaintiff's "Issue For Review" in this 
case. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In the present case, Defendants agree with Plaintiff's 
statement of the "Standard of Review." 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES 
In the present case, Defendants assent that the cases and 
statutes cited in Plaintiff's "Determinative Statutes and Cases" 
are relevant and must be considered. In addition, Defendants 
incorporate four other cases which also must be heeded, Thimmes 
v. Utah State University, 417 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 
2001), Holland v. Career Services Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993), Anderson v. Public Serv. Com'n of Utah., 839 P.2d 
822 (Utah 1992), Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied 
Science v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982). Copies are 
attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants generally agree with the underlying facts of 
Plaintiff's "Statement of the Case." However, although the facts 
are correct, Plaintiff has stated the facts in a biased manner. 
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Not only has he mischaracterized certain events, he has addressed 
irrelevant subject matter. Specifically, the stated facts 
surrounding the attorney planning meeting are not only irrelevant 
to whether or not Plaintiff directed and delivered his notice of 
claim to the county clerk, but misstated as well. As stated in 
Plaintiff's Brief, the planning meeting was scheduled for 
September 7, 2 0 00, and although it did have to be rescheduled 
Defendants had continuous contact with Plaintiff.1 It was 
improper for Plaintiff to even include such facts as they are not 
available on the appellate record. Further, it must be 
emphasized that Plaintiff acknowledged here that he never 
directed and delivered his notice of claim to the Kane County 
Clerk. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The bottom line in this case, is that Plaintiff did not 
strictly comply with the statutory requirements of the Utah 
Counsel represents there was contact with Plaintiff's counsel 
during the time frame in which Plaintiff contends that Defendants' 
counsel ''failed to return calls". See Appellant's Brief at p. 3. 
Defendants recognize that this is information not available in the 
record, but feel compelled to make reference to it in light of 
Plaintiff's Brief. Also, the correspondence regarding the attorney 
planning meeting which Plaintiff has included in his Addendum C is 
improper as it is not a part of the appellate record. Moreover, 
Defendants must note, regarding Plaintiff's contention that 
Defendants incurred more than the necessary expense, it would have 
incurred more expense to have held an attorney's planning meeting 
before the court had ruled on the motion to dismiss, since the 
meeting was ultimately unnecessary as the court dismissed 
Plaintiff s claim. 
2 
Governmental Immunity Act (hereinafter, "Immunity Act"), thus, 
the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim was not only 
proper, but required. 
In his brief, Plaintiff has admitted that he failed to 
direct and deliver the notice of claim to the county clerk as 
required by the Immunity Act, yet he continued to try and color 
his actions as substantial compliance. However, Plaintiff's acts 
do not rise to the level of substantial compliance. In fact, 
Plaintiff has conceded that he directed and delivered his notice 
of claim to the Kane County Commissioners. He never even 
attempted to direct and deliver the notice to the clerk of Kane 
County. Rather, Plaintiff has attempted to argue that although 
he did not follow the explicit language of the statutes and 
directed and delivered his notice of claim to the county clerk, 
fortuitously for him, it was eventually received by the county 
clerk's office, and that such inaction constitutes substantial 
compliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiff is 
wrong in this argument.2 
defendants must address Plaintiff's allusion that Kane County 
incurred excessive expense in filing motions addressing Plaintiff's 
noncompliance with the rules. Here, Kane County retained counsel 
as they were being sued by Plaintiff, it was counsel's duty to 
ensure that Plaintiff followed the rules as to his lawsuit. 
Plaintiff's mistakes were the cause for Defendants motions. First, 
Plaintiff misfiled the case in Washington County. Plaintiff should 
have filed the suit initially in Kane County and then moved the 
court to change venue. However, since he did not, Defendants made 
a motion to dismiss and the court, ordered sua sponte, that venue 
(continued...) 
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This is a simple case as it is clear that the rule regarding 
the notice requirements of the Immunity Act is that of strict 
compliance. As in this case, where the Immunity Act is clear on 
its face as to whom the notice of claim should be directed and 
delivered to, there is no need to interpret: and manipulate 
legislative intent. The statute specifically states that, when 
bringing a claim against a county, the notice of claim must be 
directed and delivered to the county clerk. One must only read 
the statute to determine the proper notice requirements. Now, 
Plaintiff has made a desperation argument to this Court in an 
effort to cure the fact that he failed to read and follow the 
explicit instructions of the statute 
Plaintiff has also submitted that he met the overall purpose 
of the Immunity Act, and that Defendants should have been 
estopped from moving for dismissal. Again, Plaintiff is wrong in 
2(„ .continued) 
be changed and stated that "proper venue of this action is clearly 
in Kane County, not Washington County, and any transfer from Kane 
County to Washington County . . . must be made by a district court 
judge in Kane County. To this extent, Defendants are entirely 
correct." See R. at 51, Order Changing Venue, attached hereto as 
Addendum B. Second, Plaintiff did not follow the Immunity Act's 
notice requirements, and of course Defendants moved the court to 
dismiss Plaintiff's suit as the court lacked jurisdiction. See R. 
at 54-115. While Plaintiff argues that Defendants' motions were ua 
detriment of the taxpayer," (see Appellant's Brief at p.4» 
interestingly the courts recognized legal soundness of the 
substance of Defendants' motions and ordered venue to be changed 
back to Kane County and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. See 
R. at 49-52, Addendum B, See R. at 121-127, Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, attached hereto as Addendum C. 
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his argument as estoppel is generally inappropriate to assert 
against governmental entities. 
Further, this Court has been very explicit in declaring that 
strict compliance is the law. In fact, as recently as March, 
2001, it has been proclaimed so. Plaintiff has only three cases 
on which he reaches to rely. However, one case is wholly 
inapplicable as it deals with a completely different statute than 
the one at issue. The other two cases are easily distinguished 
from the case at hand, and in fact, are supportive of Defendants' 
position. In both cases, it was stated that strict compliance is 
the law and that only because of very specific facts, did the 
court reach what seems to be a more flexible holding of the law. 
Plaintiff's reliance on these cases and facts is misplaced. 
Finally, Plaintiff has argued that this Court should now 
adjust the law to make it one of "substantial compliance." 
Again, this Court has declared over and over again that strict 
compliance is the law and Plaintiff has not offered any 
compelling reason to deviate from what has advanced justice for 
over twenty-five years. Additionally, after the clarifying 1998 
amendments were made, the statute stated explicitly whom one 
should direct and deliver a notice of claim to, thus, allowing 
anything short of strict compliance would annul the purpose of 
the changes. Furthermore, this is not the correct forum in which 
5 
to seek an adjustment of the statute. Any change must be 
legislatively mandated. 
The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff's claims for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and this Court should affirm 
its holding. 
ARGUMENT 
I, PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE HE 
DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT'S 
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-13 and 63-30-11 explicitly state, in 
relevant part: 
§13: A claim against a political 
subdivision, or against its employee . . ., 
is barred unless notice of claim is filed 
with the governing body of the political 
subdivision according to the requirements of 
Section 63-30-11 within one year after the 
claim arises, . . . 
§ 11: (b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is 
against a county; (Emphasis added). 
See Appellants' Addendum A 
This Court has consistently held that strict compliance of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is required. Rushton v. Salt 
Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999), (see Scarborough v. 
Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1972) (This 
Court stated "[w]e have consistently held that where a cause of 
action is based upon a statute, full compliance with its 
requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a 
6 
suit." (Emphasis added)). Further this Court has held that, 
u
 [a]ctual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet the 
notice of claim requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act," 
Rushton, at 1201, and that even in "situations where a 
governmental agency may be given actual notice of a party's 
claim, the party must still file a notice of claim in full 
compliance with the statute in order to pursue its claim." Great 
West Casualty v. UT Dept. of Transportation, 415 Utah Adv. Rep. 
26 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
Further, this Court has held that when interpreting a 
statute, the plain language is first examined. State v. Vigil, 
842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992), Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This Court stated that 
u[w]e will resort to other methods of statutory interpretation 
only if we find the language of the statutes to be ambiguous." 
Vigil, at 845. In Bellonio, regarding § 13 of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, the Court of Appeals of Utah found 
they need look no further than the statute's plain language. 
Bellonio, at 1296. "The plain meaning of section 13 is that a 
claim against a political subdivision is 'barred' unless notice 
is filed with the 'governing body,' which is enumerated in § 63-
3 0-11, within one year of the claim arising." Id. As recently 
as this year, courts have already declared twice, that the notice 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act are to be strictly 
7 
construed and full compliance with its requirements is a 
condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit. Thimmes v. 
Utah State University, 417 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah Ct- App. 2001), 
Great West Casualty.3 
Plaintiff's Delivery Of His Notice Was NOT Legally Sufficient Nor 
Did It Amount To Substantial Compliance. 
In his Brief, the basis for Plaintiff's appeal was that the 
trial court was wrong to dismiss his case because he 
substantially complied when his notice was received by employees 
of the county clerk's office, thus allowing Defendants an 
opportunity to properly and timely investigate the merits of the 
case. Plaintiff's argument is premised on three cases, Brittain 
v. State by and through Utah Department of Employment, 882 P.2d 
666 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), Bischel v. Merit, 907 P.2d 275 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995), and Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 
(Utah 1980). However, Plaintiff's reliance on the above cases is 
misplaced and the facts are distinguishable to the facts of the 
case at hand. 
In Brittain, the court determined that where the plaintiff 
directed and delivered their notice of claim to Risk Management 
3It must be noted that in the Great West Casualty decision, 
Judge Orme expressed frustration that any change to the state's 
"immunity scheme" cannot be resolved in this forum, and is an issue 
for the legislature, not the courts. See Appellees' Argument II in 
this Brief. 
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and the attorney general, the requirements of § 63-3 0-12 were 
satisfied. At the time of Brittain's holding, § 12 provided: 
A claim against the state, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the 
claim arises. Brittain, at 669 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993) 
However the court the court in Bellonio distinguished Brittain in 
one respect, because it was a case involving § 12 rather than § 
13. Bellonio, at 1297. The case was further distinguished by 
the court's reasoning that while the court found it "reasonable" 
to construe Risk Management as the "agency concerned" as set 
forth in § 12, § 13 contained no language that the city's legal 
counsel was entitled to the notice. Id. 
In Bischel, the court found a notice of claim sufficient 
where the plaintiff directed and delivered notice to the county 
attorney as opposed to the county commission. The plaintiff did 
not know who to serve, so she called the commission to ask. In 
response, the plaintiff was instructed to direct and deliver her 
notice to the Salt Lake County Attorney. It must be noted that 
at the time of Bischel, the notice requirements of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act were more ambiguous than they are under 
the present code. When Bischel was decided, § 13 stated only 
that a claim against a political subdivision "is barred unless 
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notice is filed with the governing body of the political 
subdivision within one year after the claim arises." Bischel, at 
277 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). There was no 
reference to § 11 to specify who the governing body was. The 
court stated in its distinguishment, that, 
Thus, the end result in Bischel was not based 
upon a substantial compliance or constructive 
notice theory, but rather was founded upon 
the apparent agency of the commission 
employee. Bischel at 1298. 
In Stahl, the statute at issue was not even the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Rather, the issue was whether or not 
the plaintiff had fulfilled the thirty day notice as required by 
the Utah Public Transit Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-20-56. Stahl, 
at 480-81. This Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss 
because the Utah Public Transit Act did not contain an express 
bar against maintaining an action for noncompliance and found the 
plaintiff's substantial compliance sufficient. Id. at 481-82. 
This Court declared that "generally a direction in a statute to 
do an act is considered "mandatory" when consequences are 
attached to the failure to act. Id. at 481-82. Taken 
conversely, this statement means that the legislature intended to 
bar actions for noncompliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act's notice requirements.4 
4It must be noted that Stahl, a 1980 case, is neither binding 
or controlling, nor is there any case regarding the issue at hand 
(continued...) 
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A binding and more factually similar case is that of 
Bellonio. In Bellonio, the plaintiff argued that constructive 
notice, coupled with substantial compliance was sufficient but 
the court disagreed. Bellonio, at 1296. In the Bellonio case, 
the plaintiff tripped and fell in the parking terrace at the Salt 
Lake Airport on June 14, 1992. Bellonio's first attorney 
informed the insurance carrier that he was plaintiff's counsel, 
this information was forwarded to Robert M. Kern, the airport's 
legal counsel. Mr. Kern instructed that any further 
correspondence should come to his office. Id. at 1295. 
Bellonio retained a second attorney who engaged in a number 
of correspondences between the plaintiff and Mr. Kern, and then 
on March 24, 1993, directed and delivered a notice of claim to 
Mr. Kern. Mr. Kern acknowledged receipt and indicated that he 
was awaiting further reports. On July 11, Bellonio directed and 
delivered his notice of claim to the Utah Attorney General, the 
Salt Lake City Attorney, and the Airport Director, but not upon 
Salt Lake City's Mayor or the Salt Lake City Council. Id. 
On June 14, 1993, Bellonio's third attorney filed a 
complaint against Salt Lake City and the Airport. The trial 
court dismissed Bellonio's claim against the airport but not 
against Salt Lake City. The City brought an interlocutory appeal 
4(...continued) 
where the c o u r t s r e l y on i t . 
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seeking dismissal because Bellonio failed to strictly comply with 
the notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. Id. 
As in this case, Bellonio attempted to rely on Brittain and 
Bischel and argued that since Mr. Kern had told him to direct all 
correspondence to him, that dismissal would be inappropriate. 
However the court relied on the fact that while the airport's 
attorney did request that all communication be sent to him, he 
never indicated that he was the proper agent to receive the 
notice of claim. The court further held that Bischel was not 
persuasive because Mr. Kern was never the agent of the mayor of 
the city or the council. Regarding Bellonio's reliance on 
Brittain and Bischel, the court declared that: 
[w]hile . . . it may seem to indicate a 
flexible rule of constructive notice to 
governmental entities, this is not the 
general rule in this state. Bellonio, at 12 97 
(emphasis added). 
Further, the court set forth: 
[T]he precedential effect of [these] cases is 
limited by their unique factual underpinnings 
and therefore, neither should be construed as 
an indication that we are prepared to 
abrogate the longstanding rule requiring 
strict compliance with all aspects of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Id. (emphasis 
added). 
The court also noted that Bellonio "never even attempted to 
direct his notice of claim to the proper party, i.e., the mayor 
12 
of the city council." Bellonio, at 1298. In their holding, the 
court found that Bellonio's claim was barred since he did not 
file the required notice of claim set forth in § 63-30-13. 
Another acutely applicable case is that of Thimmes, In 
Thimmes, the plaintiff was not sure who to direct and deliver her 
notice to, so she called the Utah Attorney General's Office. 
Plaintiff contended that someone at the Attorney General's office 
instructed her to direct and deliver her notice of claim to Risk 
Management. Id. In Thimmes the plaintiff argued that Bischel 
applied because she was instructed by a state agent to direct and 
deliver her notice of claim to Risk Management. However, the 
court found that the "[a]ppellant ha [d] not presented sufficient 
evidence to justify her reliance on the advice of an unnamed 
state employee rather than the plain language of section 63-3 0-
12." Id. The court noted that: 
[T]he [Utah Governmental Immunity] statute 
gives explicit directions. Any confusion 
over who should receive the notice was 
created by Appellant when she elected to rely 
on advice from an unnamed state employee, 
rather than the plain language of the 
statute. 
Thimmes, at 5. The court also declared again, that in their 
decision in Bellonio, that u[w]e pointed to the unique factual 
circumstances of Bischel and said our decision in that case 
should not be viewed as an 'abrogat[ion of] the long-standing 
rule requiring strict compliance with all aspects of the 
13 
Governmental Immunity Act."' Id. (citing Bellonio, at 
1297)(emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the explicit language of §§ 63-30-11 
and 63-30-13 states that the notice of claim must be directed and 
delivered to the county clerk when a county is being sued. See 
Appellants' Brief, Addendum A. Plaintiff has offered in his 
Brief that in correspondences dated August 3, 1999, and September 
24, 1999, he directed and delivered his notice of claim twice to 
the wrong governmental body, the Kane County Commissioners: 
Stephen Crosby, Joe C. Judd, and Norman Carroll. See Appellants 
Brief at p. 3, Addendum C.5 Plaintiff conceded in his opposition 
memorandum to Defendants' Motion to dismiss that he "does not 
deny that he failed to properly file a notice of claim." See R. 
at 114. Nor did Plaintiff ever even attempt to direct and 
deliver his notice of claim to the Kane County Clerk. Further, 
Plaintiff never inquired of anyone whether or not his notice was 
sufficient. Based on these facts and as a matter of law, Judge 
Mower dismissed Plaintiff's claim as the court did not have 
jurisdiction. See R. at 121-127, Addendum C. 
Plaintiff has also alluded that since Defendants' counsel 
stipulated in another case that he would not raise the argument 
that Defendants did not have an opportunity to properly and 
5Again, Plaintiff has referenced and incorporated improperly 
that which is not available on this record. 
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timely investigate the merits of the case, that now Plaintiff's 
noncompliance should be overlooked. First, Plaintiff's 
contention in this regard is wholly irrelevant to the issue at 
hand. Second this argument is improper and inappropriate as it 
is not part of the appellate record in this case, and is a 
complete mischaracterization of counsel's stipulation.6 
Kane County is well aware of the court decisions enunciating 
the policy purpose of the notice requirements to allow a 
governmental entity to investigate and settle a claim. The 
reason for the stipulation in the Bear River Insurance Co. v. 
Kane County case was in recognition of the fact that Kane County 
does not intend to advance any argument that under facts of this 
case or any related cases, that it did not have an adequate 
6In his Brief, Plaintiff stated that he would "supplement this 
in [his] reply brief' (see Appellant's Brief at p. 8). However, 
Defendants contend that such argument is not only irrelevant, as 
argued above, but procedurally incorrect. The Utah Rules Of 
Appellate Procedure specifically state that " [r]eply briefs shall 
be limited to answering new matter set forth in the opposing 
brief." Utah R.App.P. 24(c). If Plaintiff addresses this in his 
Reply Brief he will be raising new issues not raised in either the 
original or Appellee Brief, which will put Defendants in a 
detrimental situation as they will not be able to respond. The 
stipulation that Plaintiff refers to took place on May 1, 2001 and 
Plaintiff did not file his Brief until May 4, 2001. Plaintiff 
should have addressed it fully in his original brief or at least 
supplemented it since that point allowing Defendants to respond. 
Now, Defendants can only argue in anticipation and point out in 
advance that none of what Plaintiff refers to is in this record. 
15 
opportunity to investigate the merits of the claims.7 However, 
it is Kane County's position that this argument is not relevant 
to the issue before this Court and whether or not Plaintiffs are 
in full compliance with the Immunity Act insofar as notice is 
concerned. 
Additionally, this argument ignores the fact that there are 
an unlimited number of circumstances where a county may, as a 
practical matter, be in a position so as to evaluate a claim for 
which it has knowledge, and yet the claimant has utterly failed 
to comply with the Immunity Act. For example, sending and 
serving a notice of claim on the attorney representing Kane 
County would certainly allow Kane County to have knowledge of a 
potential claim and presumably investigate, but clearly the 
notice would be insufficient. See Bellonio. 
Here, Plaintiff's argument that he substantially complied 
with the compulsory notice requirements of the Immunity Act by 
directing and delivering his notice of claim to the Kane County 
Commissioners is farcical. First, Plaintiff's actions cannot 
amount to substantial compliance -- how can Plaintiff's actions 
equate substantial compliance when he never addressed his notice 
of claim to the county clerk or even made an attempt to ensure 
7The facts of the Bear River case are completely different from 
the facts at hand, and Plaintiff has failed to recognize that 
perhaps the stipulation was justified and based on the specific 
facts of that case. 
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that the county clerk received the notice pursuant to the 
requirements of the statute? Just as the court stated in 
Thimmes, in this case as well, any confusion over who should have 
received the notice was created by Plaintiff. He simply should 
have read the plain language of the statute and directed and 
delivered his notice of claim to the Kane County Clerk. Kanab, 
the county seat, is a small town, the Kane County Clerk is a 
public official who has an office open to the public. It would 
have been very easy for Plaintiff to inquire as to who the county 
clerk was. Second, assuming arguendo, that Plaintiff's actions 
did constitute substantial compliance, this Court has made it 
clear in Rushton that strict compliance is the rule and that even 
Defendants' actual notice of Plaintiff's lawsuit pursuant to the 
clerk auditor's signature and acceptance for the notice of claim, 
which was not addressed to the Kane County Clerk, is ineffectual 
and does not usurp his responsibility to properly direct and 
deliver the notice to the Kane County Clerk. 
For the reasons above, the trial court was correct in 
finding that Plaintiff did not comply with the statutory notice 
requirements, which resulted in the proper dismissal of his 
claim. 
17 
Estoppel CANNOT Be Invoked Against Kane County. 
Plaintiff has argued that the Defendants should have been 
"estopped from asserting the failure to file the notice of claim 
. . ." See Appellant's Brief at p. 6. 
Generally, estoppel may not be invoked against governmental 
entities. Thimmes, at 5, Mendez v. State Dept. of Social 
Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It has been 
well settled that estoppel is only assertable against 
governmental entities in "unusual situations in which it is 
plainly apparent that failing to apply the rule would result in 
manifest injustice.'' Holland v. Career Services Review Bd. , 856 
P.2d 678, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (see, Anderson v. Public Serv. 
Com'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992), Utah State 
University of Agriculture and Applied Science v. Sutro & Co., 646 
P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982) . The court went on to declare that 
Mi]n such cases, 'the critical inquiry is whether it appears 
that the facts may be found with such certainty, and the 
injustice to be suffered is one of sufficient gravity, to invoke 
the exception.'" Holland, at 682 (citing Utah State University, 
at 720). The court also noted that the this Court in Anderson 
declared that u[t]he few cases in which Utah courts have 
permitted estoppel against the government have involved very 
specific written representations by authorized government 
18 
entities." Holland, at 682 (citing Anderson, at 827) (emphasis 
added). 
In light of the general rule precluding the invocation of 
estoppel against governmental entities, and the clear and plain 
language of §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-13, while Plaintiff has 
asserted that Defendants should be estopped, they never relied on 
any representations, written or otherwise, that their notice of 
claim was sufficient. Further, Plaintiff never established the 
required presence of "manifest injustice." All Plaintiff's 
reasoning and argument cannot gloss over the fact that he did not 
strictly comply with the notice requirements. For these reasons, 
this Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal. 
II. STRICT COMPLIANCE IS THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
In Plaintiff's second issue on appeal, he has argued that 
this Court should now overturn the long standing law of strict 
compliance and find substantial compliance adequate. The 
gravamen of Plaintiff's appeal is that if a governmental body has 
knowledge of a compliant and adequate time to investigate it, 
regardless of how or who the notice of claim is directed and 
delivered to, then notice should be effective. 
In the landmark case of Scarborough, this Court explicitly 
stated that: 
We have consistently held that where a cause 
of action is based upon a statute, full 
compliance with its requirements is a 
19 
condition precedent to the right to maintain 
suit. 
Scarborough, at 4 82 (emphasis added). Further, and even more 
recently, the Utah Court of Appeals announced again in Thimmes 
that strict compliance is the rule. Thimmes, at 5. 
Additionally, in a recent decision concerning § 13, the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Great West Casualty recognized that the 
judicial forum is not the place to adjust the strict compliance 
rule and refused to do so. The court stated: 
[s]uch an adjustment in the philosophy 
underlying our State's sovereign immunity 
scheme must, however, come at the hands of 
the Legislature and not this Court. Great 
West Casualty, at 27-28. 
For over twenty-five years, from Scarborough in 1975 to 
Great West Casualty and Thimmes in 2 001, the courts have 
recognized and respected a rule of strict compliance of all 
aspects of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, specifically the 
notice requirements. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act has 
evolved from a substandard substantial compliance rule to a more 
effective, strict compliance standard, which has become a rule 
affording and promoting justice and equity as § 63-30-13 
explicitly sets forth requirements as to whom notice should be 
directed and delivered to, as well as the consequences for 
failure to follow them. 
20 
Plaintiff's argument that the purpose of the 1998 amendment 
of § 13 was "to address the previous ambiguity of who was to be 
served on the 'governing body' so that the primary purpose 
(notice of the governing body) would be fulfilled[.]" (See 
Appellant's Brief at p. 17) is exactly on point. Here, the 1998 
amendment cleared up any ambiguities about whom to direct and 
deliver a notice of claim to, thus with such clear-cut 
instructions there is even more reason for courts to adhere to 
their strict application of the notice requirements. 
The purpose of the 1998 change was to clarify, without 
thought, what the term "governing body" meant. Now, it would 
defeat the whole purpose of the clarifying amendment for this 
Court to carve out exceptions. Courts have gone back to strict 
compliance because they recognize the slippery slope that such 
exceptions would create. Once courts start allowing exception, 
upon exception, upon exception, where would it stop and what 
would be the point of having the act without enforcing any of the 
requirements? With no defining end, the very thing the 1998 
amendments were implemented for would be negated. The 
legislature has made these clarifying changes so that courts 
would not have to carve out exceptions, thus it would not be 
proper for further changes to come from the another forum other 
than the legislature. 
21 
As stated above, in decisions that seem to make the rule 
more flexible, it has been declared that: 
[w]hile . . . it may seem to indicate a 
flexible rule of constructive notice to 
governmental entities, this is not the 
general rule in this state. Bellonio, at 1297 
(emphasis added). 
Further, the court set forth: 
[T]he precedential effect of [these] cases is 
limited by their unique factual underpinnings 
and therefore, neither should be construed as 
an indication that we are prepared to 
abrogate the longstanding rule requiring 
strict compliance with all aspects of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Strict compliance has been declared the law in order ensure 
that the proper entities know when they are being sued, so they 
are able to prepare for litigation. If the courts had to 
determine in each and every case whether notice requirements had 
been substantially complied with, our already limited judicial 
resources would be wasted. 
In this case, Plaintiff has admitted that he did not direct 
and deliver his notice of claim to the Kane County Clerk. Thus, 
and as argued above, Plaintiff has not even substantially 
complied with the compulsory notice requirements. No matter how 
Plaintiff tries to color his actions as sufficient, his efforts 
have been wholly inadequate under all twenty-five (25) years of 
existing jurisprudence. Yet now, in a last ditch effort he is 
22 
reaching to this Court to overturn a well defined and mandated 
rule to establish sufficiency in order to reverse the trial 
court's decision and remand the issue for trial. For the 
foregoing reasons and since this Court is not the proper forum in 
which to adjust the strict compliance rule, the strict compliance 
standard must be upheld, making anything less absolutely 
deficient. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Plaintiff did not strictly comply with the 
requirements set forth in § 63-30-13 and directed and delivered 
his notice of claim with the Kane County Clerk within the one 
year statutory time period, the trial court was required to 
dismiss Plaintiff's claim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court was 
correct in dismissing Plaintiff's suit and its decision must be 
upheld. 
DATED on this P\ day of May, 2001. 
STIRBA Sc HATHAWAY 
By: 
PETER STIRBA 
AIMEE K. MARTINEZ 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A 
rrovo, uan 
future. Following those equivocal answers, follow-up 
questions revealed that resolving the mother's 
problems would take a "significant amount of time," 
and that the father felt the children "deserve a lot 
more than I can give them right now." Then, 
Appellants both unequivocally agreed that 
relinquishment and adoption into a loving and stable 
environment was in the children's best interests. 
Given this testimony, the family's extensive history 
with the Division of Child and Family Services, and 
the nature of Appellants' personal problems, we 
conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that termination of parental 
rights was in the children's best interests 
f 8 Appellants finally assert that they were denied 
effective assistance of counsel. In their briefs on 
appeal, Appellants' only argument oh this issue is a 
terse assertion, without citation to the record or any 
legal authority, that counsels' "superficial and cursory 
examination of [Appellants]" constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel because it prevented them from 
both expressing their true feelings and demonstrating 
"on record that [they] had an adequate 
understanding" of the proceeding and its 
consequences. Rule 24(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requires that all arguments 
contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on.1' Id Because Appellants have 
failed to cite to the record and any legal authority in 
support of their ineffective assistance claim, we could 
properly refuse to consider it. See State v. Thomas, 
1999 UT 2,111,974 P.2d 2<59. 
\9 In any went , the argument fails on its merits. 
Appellants firsf raised their ineffective assistance 
claim in their post- judgment motion under Rule 
60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.3 To 
establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, 
an appellant must show that "counsel's performance 
was objectively deficient and that counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced the case." In re Eli., 880 
P.2cl 11, 13 (Utah Ct. % p . 1994). Appellants' only 
contention in their briefs on appeal is that counsels' 
examinations of Appellants during the relinquishment 
proceeding were inadequate. Even assuming that 
counsels' examinations were objectively deficient, 
Appellants were not 'prejudiced. The record 
establishes that the requirements of section 78-3 a-414 
were met. In additioti, Appelldnts were given an 
opportunity to ask questions at the hearing, and they 
we're asked to explain in their own words why 
termination of parental rights and adoption was in the 
children's best interests. Thus, the juvenile court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' Rule 
60(b) motion. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110,t9, 2 P.3d 451 
(establishing abuse of discretion as the proper 
standard of review for denial of Rule 60(b) motions). 
flO We affirm the juvenile court's orders 
terminating Appellants' parental rights and denying 
their post-judgment motions. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
t i l WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
UTAH 
1. At oral argument, Appellants cited In re D.L.S., 332 
N.W\2d 293 (Wis. 1983). The court in In re D.L.S., 
however, merely applied the Wisconsin statutory 
requirements for voluntary relinquishment of parental 
rights, which include an explicit right to a jury trial if 
requested by the relinquishing parent. See id, at 296 n.5. In 
re D.LS. does not stand for the proposition that due process 
requires a court to comply with Rule 11 in yoluntary 
relinquishment cases 
2. Although a conclusion on the best interest of the children 
is included in the juvenile court's findings of fact, such a 
determination is "more properly labeled a conclusion of 
law "In re SLA 999 UT App 390 at 130 n.6. 
3. Rule 60(b)(6) is "sufficiently broad" to permit a court to 
set aside a judgment for ineffective assistance of counsel 
Stewart v Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d 156, 158, 506 P.2d 74, 76 
(1973) 
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I BENCH, Judge: 
K1 Appellant argues that the trial court erred when'it 
granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss after 
! concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case 
j because of Appellant's failure to properly serve a 
notice of claim on the Utah Attorney General. We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
\2 On March 17, 1997, Appellant was struck by a 
vehicle operated by Appellee Haven B. Hendricks, an 
employee of Appellee Utah State University. 
\ Appellant prepared a complaint against Appellees for 
damages resulting from the accident. Pursuant to t^e 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, AppelWftt 
prepared two notices of claim to be served in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 {1997).l 
An employee of Appellant's attorney sent one notice 
of claim to Utah State University and called the 
fCE REPORTS 
'ode-Co 
tovo, Utah 
Thimmes v. Utah State University 
417Ut*ftAdv.Rep 4 \ _ 
Office of the Utah Attorney General (Attorney 
General) to inquire as to whom the other notice 
;hqj#cf 1)e sent. After being transferred, the employee 
jpdke to an unidentified person who allegedly told 
ler to send the notice to the Division of Risk 
Vlanagement. The employee mailed a notice of claim 
to the Division of Risk Management on February 6, 
1998. 
J3 In January 1999, Appellant filed her complaint 
against Appellees in the First District Court. The 
Attpfriey General subsequently filed a Motion to 
Dismiss, alleging that the office had not been 
properly served with a notice of claim pursuant to 
section 63-30-12. The trial court held a hearing and 
granted the motion to dismiss. Appellant filed a 
motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. 
This appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDABJD OF REVIEW 
f 4 The issue before us is whether the trial court 
properly dismissed Appellant's complaint after 
finding that^he had not complied with the notice of 
claim requirements in section 63-30-12. "The grant 
of amotion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed 
under the same standard as the grant of a motion tp 
dismiss, i.e., We affirm the ^rant of such a motion 
onljr if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not 
recover under the facts alleged."1 Straley v. Halliday, 
2000 UT App 38,^, 997 P.2d 338(quoting Golding 
v.Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 19% P.2d 897, 898 
(Utah 1990)). The grant of amptjogto dismiss is thus 
a matter of laW, which "we review for correctness." 
Id. 
ANALYSIS 
%5 Appellant relies on Bischel v. Merritt, 907 F.2d 
L275 <Utah€t. App. 1995) to support her contention 
that ^ he complied with the requirements for filing a 
nqfice of claim. However, We^  conclude that the J 
circumstances in Bischelzre^ilj distinguished from 
this case. In Bischel, we recdgnized the established 
rule of strict compliance with the notice provisions of 
tire Utah Governmental Immunity Act! See id. at 279. 
We also acknowledged ambiguities in Utah Code 
Ann. §§63-30-11,-13 (1993) because they did not 
"prescribe a specific manner or method for filing 
notice with the governing body of the political 
subdivision." Bischel, 907 P.2d at 278. Specifically, 
we concluded that "direction and delivery of the 
notice must be inferred from the phrase, 'notice of 
claim is filed with the governing body of the political 
subdivision within one year after the claim arises.1" 
Id. (Quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993)). 
Because the statute did not specify to whom Bischel 
was to direct her notice of claim, we concluded that 
she could rely on representations of an employee of 
the county attorney's office that she could direct her 
notice to that office. S&e id. In Bellonio v Salt Lake 
City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) we 
explained the effect of Bischel on the general rule 
requiring strict compliance with the Governmental 
Imrriunity Act. We pointed to the unique factual 
circumstances of Bischel andsaid our decision in that 
case should not be viewed as an "abrbgatpon of] the 
long-standing rule requiring strict compliance withall 
aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act," 
Bellonio, 911 P.2d at 1297. 
K6 In this case, Appellant's clairh is against the State, 
««* 4U* nntmtv Thic rase is therefore governed by 
in part: "A claim against the state... is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the attorney general and 
the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises " Id. (emphasis added). Section 63-30-12 does 
not contain the same ambiguities as to whom the 
notice of claim should be directed as sections 
63-30-11 and -13. An individual making^claim 
against the State need not infer which governmental 
entity should be served with notice—the statute gives 
explicit directions. Any confusion over who should 
receive the notice was created by Appellant when she 
elected to rely on advice from an unnamed state 
employee; rather than the plain language of the 
statute. 
f 7 Appellant would also have us conclude that the 
Division of Risk Management is an office of the 
Attorney General because an assistant attorney 
general maintains an office -there. However, in 
Straley^ we recognized that while notice^to the 
Division of Risk Management may be "sufficient to 
comply with . . . [the] requirement that the notice of 
claim also be filed with the agency concerned,... it 
cannot suffice for the Immunity Act's requirement that 
notice be filed with the Attorney General." Straley, 
2000 UT App 38 at ^ \6 n.9 (internal citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
f 8 Finally, Appellant contends that this case falls 
within the exception to the general rule that 
"precludes the assertion of estoppel against the 
government." Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 
P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). The exception to this 
general rule, however, applies only in cases where 
"the facts may be found with such certainty, and the 
injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to 
invoke the exception*" Id. The exception requires "a 
high standard of proof * and has only applied in cases 
involving "very specific written representations by 
authorized government entities." Anderson v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992). No 
written representation was involved in this case, and 
Appellant cannot even name the state employee on 
whose advice she relied. Appellant does not allege, 
and we can find no indication of, willful misconduct 
on the government's part nor an intent to hinder 
Appellant's pursuit of her claim. Thus, we conclude 
that Appellant falls far short of meeting the high 
standard of proof required for us to apply estoppel in 
this case. > 
CONCLUSION 
K9 Appellant has not presented sufficient evidence to 
justify her reliance on the advice of an unnamed state 
employee rather than the plain language of section 
63-30-12. Appellant did not strictly comply with the 
notice requirements of section 63-30-12 because she 
failed to serve notice of her claim on the Attorney 
General within the specified time period. Therefore, 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Appellant's claim and we affirm the dismissal of her 
complaint. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1J10 WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge 
State v. One 1980 Cadillac a>de-cc 
417 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 Provo, Utat 
1. At the time Appellant's claim arose, section 63-30-12 
required that notice be served on "the attorney general and 
the agency concerned," Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (1997). 
Subsequently, section 63-30-12 has been revised to require 
that a notice of claim be served only on the Attorney 
General. See Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (Supp. 2000). 
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DURHAM, Justice: 
^ 1 Appellant Rick Dee Keebler ("Keebler") appeals 
pro se from the trial court's judgment, pursuant to the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-13(1998), ordering forfeiture of his 1980 
Cadillac and $3676 in United States currency to the 
State of Utah* We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 On September 20, 1994, while driving a 1980 
Cadillac in Sevier County, Utah, Keebler was stopped 
by the Utah Highway Patrol for a traffic offense. A 
search of the vehicle revealed that Keebler was 
transporting large quantities of controlled substances, 
including methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and 
marijuana. The officer arrested Keebler and seized the 
1980 Cadillac and $3676 cash found in Keebler's 
possession. Keebler was subsequently charged and 
convicted under federal drug charges. Throughout 
this litigation, he has been incarcerated and continues 
to serve as an inmate in federal prison. 
%3 On September 30, 1994, the State of Utah filed a 
complaint and notice of seizure and forfeiture in the 
Sixth Judicial District Court in Sevier County. In the 
complaint, the state alleged that the 1980 Cadillac and 
the $3676 were being used or intended for use to 
facilitate the transportation, receipt, possession, 
and/or concealment of illegal narcotics in violation of 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act. Therefore, the 
state urged forfeiture of Keebler's property. Keebler 
answered the complaint and denied the state's 
allegations. 
f4 No further action was taken in this matter until 
May 27, 1998, when the state moved for summary 
judgment. After Keebler opposed the motion, the trial 
court denied summary judgment because the use of 
the seized currency was in dispute. Subsequently, 
while still incarcerated, Keebler moved for final 
disposition of the matter. 
1(5 A scheduling conference was held on December 
8,1998, at which Keebler appeared via telephone. At 
that time, the court scheduled a bench trial for March 
23,1999. About one month before the scheduled trial 
date, Keebler petitioned the trial court for an order 
requiring the State of Utah to bear the cost of 
transporting him to appear and testify at the trial. 
However, the trial court did not act on the motion and 
the bench trial was held as scheduled. Keebler, still 
incarcerated, was not present or represented at the 
trial. 
f 6 After trial, the court made findings of fact that at 
the time of Keebler's arrest, he possessed and was 
transporting large quantities of narcotics for illegal 
d i s t r ibu t ion , inc luding 8 pounds of 
methamphetamine, 1 kilogram of cocaine, 5 ounces of 
heroin, and 11.5 pounds of marijuana. The trial court 
found that Keebler actually admitted his intent to 
break the narcotics down into small quantities and sell 
them illegally for an anticipated return of $175,000. 
In addition, the trial court found that Keebler 
admitted he had previously purchased and distributed 
for profit other illegal narcotics, including 2 pounds 
of methamphetamine, 1 kilogram of cocaine, 2 ounces 
of heroin, and 6 pounds of marijuana. Based on these 
findings of fact, the court concluded that the 1980 
Cadillac was being used to transport narcotics and 
that the currency constituted proceeds of narcotics 
distribution in violation of the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act. The trial court ordered that the 1980 
Cadillac and the $3676 be forfeited to the state. 
f7 On appeal, Keebler raises three claims of error. 
He argues that (1) the trial court's judgment 
constitutes double jeopardy because Keebler's 
conviction on federal drug charges is based on the 
same conduct relevant to the forfeiture proceeding, 
I (2) the trial court's judgment violates Keebler's right 
j to due process of law because the state did not bear 
the cost of transporting him to Utah to appear at the 
trial and did not appoint counsel to represent him, and 
(3) the trial court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction in the forfeiture proceeding because 
Keebler was convicted under federal jurisdiction and 
was not charged under the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[^8 The trial court's judgment contained no express 
conclusions of law with regard to Keebler's claims of 
error. However, the inference _ inherent in the 
judgment is that the trial court found no merit to 
Keebler's constitutional and jurisdictional arguments. 
Keebler's constitutional arguments regarding double 
jeopardy and due process present questions of^law. 
State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousandjftight 
Hundred Dollars, United States Currency, and One 
Scale, 942 P.2d 343,346 (Utah 1997) (citing Ryan v. 
Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 
1995)). Subject matter jurisdiction is also a question 
of \w. Barnard v. Utah State Bar,857P.2d 917,919 
I (Utah 1993) (citing Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Kevin, HOLLAND, Petitioner, 
v. 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, State Office 
of Education, and 
Department of Human Resource Management, 
Respondents. 
No. 920486-CA. 
June 30, 1993. 
Laid off employee sought review of decision of 
Career Service Review Board (CSRB) denying 
grievance he filed against Utah State Office of 
Education and Department of Human Resource 
Management (DHRM). The Court of Appeals, 
Russon, Associate P.J., held that: (1) DHRM did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that employee was 
not eligible for automatic reappointment to graphic 
arts specialist 19 position with Office of Education, 
and (2) CSRB properly rejected employee's equitable 
estoppel claim. 
Affirmed. 
Bench, J., filed concurring opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Officers and Public Employees <@^11.8 
283 — 
2831 Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure 
2831(B) Appointment 
283kll Restrictions of Civil Service Laws or 
Rules 
283kll.8 Other Matters. 
Court of Appeals will review Department of Human 
Resource Management's (DHRM) application of its 
rules for reasonableness and rationality. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-16(4). 
[2] Officers and Public Employees <®^11.4 
283 — 
2831 Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure 
2831(B) Appointment 
283kll Restrictions of Civil Service Laws or 
Rules 
283kll.4 Eligible Lists, Certification, and 
Selection. 
Certification of employees' eligibility for 
reappointment is within sole province of Department 
of Human Resource Management (DHRM); 
however, certification is not subject to agency's 
unfettered discretion as administrative code provides 
mandatory procedures with regard to reduction in 
force (RIF) employees. U.C.A.1953, 67-19-8. 
[3] Officers and Public Employees <@^11,4 
283 — 
2831 Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure 
2831(B) Appointment 
283k 11 Restrictions of Civil Service Laws or 
Rules 
283kll.4 Eligible Lists, Certification, and 
Selection. 
Individuals listed on statewide reappointment 
register are granted hiring preference so long as they 
meet minimum qualifications for position and have 
previously attained same salary range as vacant 
position. 
[4] Officers and Public Employees ©^11.4 
283 — 
2831 Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure 
2831(B) Appointment 
283kll Restrictions of Civil Service Laws or 
Rules 
283kll.4 Eligible Lists, Certification, and 
Selection. 
Department of Human Resource Management's 
(DPRM) application of rule governing granting hiring 
preference to individuals listed on statewide 
reappointment register was reasonable and rational 
where laid off employee's previous employment did 
not have same salary range as vacant position and, 
therefore, DPRM did not abuse its discretion in 
determining employee was not eligible for automatic 
reappointment to graphic arts specialist 19 position 
with Office of Education; salary range of employee's 
previous employment as apprentice graphic arts 
camera specialist with Division of State Printing had 
midpoint of $10.84 per hour and maximum of $12.67 
per hour and salary range of graphic arts specialist 19 
position had midpoint of $10.94 per hour and 
maximum of $13.06 per hour. 
[5] Estoppel <®=^62.2(2) 
156 — 
156DI Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or 
Public Officers 
156k62.2 States and United States 
I56k62.2(2) Particular State Officers, Agencies 
or Proceedings. 
Since doctrine of equitable estoppel involves 
principles of general law, Court of Appeals will 
review Career Service Review Board's (CSRB) 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
856 P.2d 678, Holland v. Career Service Review Bd., (Utah App. 1993) Page 2 
conclusion as to employee's claim for equitable 
estoppel for correctness, granting no deference to 
agency's decision. 
[6] Estoppel <@=*52.15 
156 — 
156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k52.15 Essential Elements. 
To invoke equitable estoppel, there must be 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one 
party inconsistent with claim later asserted, reasonable 
action or inaction by other party taken on basis of first 
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act, 
and injury to second party that would result from 
allowing first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
[7] Estoppel <®^62.2(1) 
156 — 
156DI Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or 
Public Officers 
156k62.2 States and United States 
156k62.2(l) State Government, Officers, and 
Agencies in General. 
Doctrine of equitable estoppel is only assertable 
against state or its institutions in unusual situations in 
which it is plainly apparent that failing to apply rule 
would result in manifest injustice. 
[8] Estoppel <®^62.2(2) 
156 — 
156DI Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or 
Public Officers 
156k62.2 States and United States 
156k62.2(2) Particular State Officers, Agencies 
or Proceedings. 
Career Service Review Board (CSRB) properly 
rejected laid off employee's equitable estoppel claim 
that he was entitled to reinstatement at grade 19 on 
State Classified Pay Plan where he never received any 
"specific written representation" that he was entitled 
to reinstatement at grade 19, where he could not have 
reasonably relied on statement contained in Work 
Force Adjustment Plan that his previous position was 
"approximately grade 19" as he did not see statement 
until after his grievance procedure began, where he 
did not rely on reinstatement at grade 19 since he 
applied for both grade 17 and grade 19 positions, and 
listed grade 17 as minimum position he would accept, 
where he did not show an injury resulting from 
Department of Human Resource Management's 
DHRM correction of its earlier misstatement and 
where fact that DPRM put him on reinstatement 
register for an additional three months after mistake 
was discovered, as well as fact that CSRB 
subsequently put him on register for three more 
months supported finding of no manifest injustice. 
*679 J. Elent Holland and Gordon J. Swenson, Salt 
Lake City, for petitioner. 
Jan Graham and Stephen G. Schwendiman, Salt 
Lake City, for respondents. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and RUSSON, JJ. 
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Kevin Holland seeks review of a decision of the 
Career Service Review Board of the State of Utah 
denying a grievance filed by Holland against the Utah 
State Office of *680 Education and the Department 
of Human Resource Management. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Holland was employed as an apprentice graphic arts 
camera specialist with the State Printing Office from 
January 1985 until May 1990. In May 1990, Holland 
was laid off as part of a reduction in force (RIF). 
Holland was offered a bindery operator position and 
another position involving inventory and press work at 
no reduction in pay, but he declined these offers. At 
the time of the RDF, his position was on the State's 
Trade and Craft Pay Plan, and not on the Stale's 
Classified Pay Plan. However, the Work Force 
Adjustment Plan associated with the RIF listed bis 
position as "approximately [Gjrade 19 [on the 
classified pay plan]." The mid-point of his salary 
range was $10.84 per hour and the maximum was 
$12.67 per hour. 
On May 22, 1990, Holland signed a Reappointment 
Option Form, which stated: "I understand that I am 
eligible only for those career service positions which 
are of the same or lower grade as the last career 
service ... position held and for which I meet 
minimum qualifications as determined by the Division 
of Personnel Management." He listed Grade 19 as 
the minimum grade level that he was willing to 
accept, but later changed this to Grade 17. 
Holland was placed on the statewide reappointment 
register for a period of one year, and applied for 
various positions during the next several months, but 
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was unsuccessful in securing employment. In January 
1991, a Graphic Arts Specialist 19 position with the 
Office of Education became available, and Holland 
applied for it. The mid-point of the position's salary 
range was $10.94 per hour and the maximum was 
$13.06 per hour. On the January 11, 1991, 
reappointment register, Holland's last position was 
listed, but no grade level was included because it was 
not on the State's Classified Pay Plan. The minimum 
grade level he was willing to accept was listed as 
Grade 17. 
On February 19, 1991, an interview panel of the 
State Office of Education interviewed six applicants 
for the position, one of whom was Holland. The 
results of the interview scores were tabulated, and 
Holland received the second highest score. The 
applicant who received the highest score was hired for 
the position. Holland was not considered an applicant 
with reappointment rights because the midpoint and 
maximum of the salary range of his previous position 
were lower than those of the Education position, and 
because his previous position required only one year 
of prior experience, whereas the Education position 
required four years of experience. Holland filed a 
grievance with the Career Service Review Board on 
March 13, 1991, claiming that he should have been 
hired for the position because of his status on the 
reappointment register. 
On May 22, 1991, Holland was informed by the 
executive director of the Department of Human 
Resource Management that because of inadequate 
communication and delay, he would be placed on the 
reappointment register for an additional three months. 
The executive director further informed Holland that 
his previous position would be listed as Grade 18 on 
the classified pay plan. 
A hearing officer of the Career Service Review 
Board conducted an administrative hearing on 
November 15, 1991, and denied Holland's grievance. 
Holland then appealed to the Career Service Review 
Board, which sustained the hearing officer's decision 
and denied Holland's appeal. 
Holland seeks review of that decision, claiming that: 
(1) the Office of Education and the Department of 
Human Resource Management violated mandatory 
rules regarding priority in hiring from the statewide 
reappointment register, thereby impairing his rights as 
a RIF'd employee; and (2) the Career Service 
Review Board improperly rejected his equitable 
estoppel claim. (FN1) 
*681 REAPPOINTMENT DETERMINATION 
Standard of Review 
[1J The Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA) is applicable to all proceedings commenced 
on or after January 1, 1988. Utah Code Ann. § 
6346b-22(2) (1989). We therefore review Holland's 
petition under post-UAPA law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b46(4) (1989) provides: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(h) the agency action is: 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency.... 
In construing this section, the Utah Supreme Court 
has previously held that appellate courts "will ... 
employ an intermediate standard (one of some, but not 
total, deference) in reviewing [the petitioner's] claim 
that [the agency] erred in applying its rules." Union 
Pac. R.R. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876, 
879 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted); accord SEMECO 
Indus,, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 
1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
Accordingly, we review the agency's application of its 
rules for reasonableness and rationality. See Union 
Pac. R.R., 842 P.2d at 879. 
Analysis 
Holland claims that the Office of Education and the 
Department of Human Resource Management 
(DHRM) violated his rights as a RIF'd employee by 
not following mandatory rules regarding priority in 
hiring. Specifically, Holland argues that the 
respondents did not comply with Rule R468-5-4 of the 
Utah Administrative Code, which provides, in 
pertinent part: 
R468-5-4. Order of Selection For Career Service 
Positions. 
5-4. (3) Third, appointment shall be made from 
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the statewide reappointment register containing the 
names of employees who meet the minimum 
qualifications for the position and who have 
previously attained the same salary range as the 
vacant position. 
Utah Code Admin.P. R468-5-4. (3) (1991). 
Holland contends that DHRM incorrectly determined 
that he was not eligible to be considered as an 
applicant with reappointment rights for the Graphic 
Arts Specialist 19 position with the Office of 
Education, thus violating his reappointment rights 
under Rule R468-5-4. The respondents reply that 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-8 (Supp.1992) grants DHRM 
broad discretion to certify employees* eligibility for 
reappointment, and therefore, DHRM's determination 
must be upheld. (FN2) 
[2] Section 67-19-8 states that "[t]he following 
functions shall be performed by the department and 
may not be contracted or otherwise delegated to 
another state agency ... (4) maintenance of registers 
and certification of eligible applicants...." Thus, 
according to the plain language of that section, 
certification of employees' eligibility for 
reappointment is within the sole province of DHRM. 
[3] However, it does not follow that such 
certification is subject to the agency's unfettered 
discretion. The Utah Administrative *682 Code 
provides mandatory procedures which must be 
followed with regard to RIF'd employees. As noted 
by Holland, pursuant to Rule R468-5-4. (3) of the 
Utah Administrative Code, individuals listed on the 
statewide reappointment register are granted hiring 
preference so long as they "meet the minimum 
qualifications for the position and ... have previously 
attained the same salary range as the vacant position, 
Utah Code Admin.P. R468-5-4. (3) (1991) 
(emphasis added). (FN3) 
[4] In the present case, the salary range of Holland's 
previous employment as an apprentice graphic aits 
camera specialist with the Division of State Printing 
had a mid-point of $10.84 per hour and a maximum of 
$12.67 per hour. By comparison, the salary range of 
the Graphic Arts Specialist 19 position with the Office 
of Education had a mid-point of $10.94 per hour and a 
maximum of $13.06 per hour. Applying the clear and 
unambiguous language of Rule R468-5-4. (3) to the 
facts of this case, Holland's previous employment did 
not have the same salary range as the vacant position. 
Thus, DHRM's application of that rule was 
reasonable and rational. Accordingly, we conclude 
that DHRM did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that Holland was not eligible for automatic 
reappointment under that rule. 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
[5] Holland argues that the Career Service Review 
Board (CSBJ3) improperly concluded that his claim for 
equitable estoppel was without merit. Since the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel involves principles of 
general law, we review CSRB's conclusion for 
correctness, granting no deference to that agency's 
decision. See Questar Pipeline Co, v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991); Savage 
Indus, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 
(Utah 1991). 
[6] The elements necessary to invoke equitable 
estoppel are: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by 
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; 
(2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party 
taken on the basis of the first party's statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to 
the second party that would result from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. 
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 
671, 675 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). 
[7] Moreover, it is well settled that equitable 
estoppel is only assertible against the State or its 
institutions in unusual situations in which it is plainly 
apparent that failing to apply the rule would result in 
manifest injustice. See, e.g., Anderson v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992); Utah 
State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 
1982); Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979); Eldredge, 
795 P.2d at 675. In such cases, Mthe critical inquiry 
is whether it appears that the facts may be found with 
such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of 
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception/ Utah 
State Univ., 646 P.2d at 720; accord Anderson, 839 
P.2d at 827; Eldredge, 795 P.2d at 675. Further, as 
noted by our supreme court in Anderson, "[t]he few 
cases in which Utah courts have permitted estoppel 
against the government have involved very specific 
written representations by authorized government 
entities." Anderson, 839 P.2d at 827 (emphasis 
added). 
[8] Applying the above law to the facts of this case, 
Holland's claim fails. As a preliminary matter, it is 
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important to note that Holland never received any 
"specific written representation*' that he was entitled 
to reinstatement at Grade 19 on the State Classified 
Pay Plan. See id. The sole written representation 
that his previous position was even "approximately 
*683 [G]rade 19" was contained in a Work Force 
Adjustment Plan that Holland did not see until after 
his grievance procedure began. 
Furthermore, that document is insufficient to give 
rise to an equitable estoppel claim. First, the facts are 
not such that Holland can establish with sufficient 
certainty that equitable estoppel applies. See 
Anderson, 839 P.2d at 827; Utah State Univ., 646 
P.2d at 720. Even if we accept that the first element 
of equitable estoppel, a statement by one party that is 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted, is present 
here, there is no evidence that Holland reasonably 
relied to his detriment on that statement as to meet the 
second element of that doctrine. As noted above, at 
the time of his alleged reliance, Holland had not seen 
the work adjustment plan that listed his previous 
position as "approximately [G]rade 19," and thus, he 
could not have reasonably relied upon that document 
at that time. Further, the evidence before CSRB 
showed that Holland did not rely on reinstatement at 
Grade 19, since he applied for Grade 17 positions as 
well as Grade 19 positions, and listed Grade 17 as the 
minimum position he would accept. 
Also, as to the third element of equitable estoppel, 
Holland has not shown an injury resulting from 
DHRM's correction of its earlier misstatement, since 
the fact that he did not qualify for reinstatement into 
the Graphic Arts Specialist 19 position, not the 
misstatement on the work force adjustment plan, was 
the cause of his alleged injury. Because Holland was 
never qualified for reinstatement into a Grade 19 
position, he did not have a right thereto, and DHRM's 
refusal to reinstate him into such a position cannot be 
viewed as causing him injury. (FN4) 
Additionally, Holland has not established the 
"manifest injustice" requirement of Utah State Univ. 
v. Sutro <fc Co. and its progeny. See Utah State 
Univ., 646 P.2d at 718; accord Anderson, 839 P.2d 
at 827; Eldredge, 795 P.2d at 675. This is 
especially true in light of the fact noted above that the 
statement that his previous position was 
"approximately [G]rade 19" was not the cause of his 
injury, if any injury existed at all. Furthermore, the 
fact that DHRM put him on the reinstatement register 
for an additional three months after the mistake was 
discovered, as well as the fact that CSRB 
subsequently put him on the register for three more 
months after that, weighs in favor of finding no 
manifest injustice. Thus, we conclude that CSRB did 
not err in determining that Holland's claim for 
equitable estoppel was without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we hold that (1) the Department of 
Human Resource Management did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that Holland was not eligible 
for automatic reappointment to the Graphic Arts 
Specialist 19 position with the Office of Education; 
and (2) the Career Service Review Board properly 
rejected Holland's equitable estoppel claim. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Judge, concurring: 
I concur. I write separately to clarify that there is 
more than one possible standard of review when relief 
is requested under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. As the main 
opinion correctly points out, the supreme court has 
adopted a deferential reasonableness standard when 
reviewing an agency's "application" of an 
administrative rule to the facts. See Union Pacific 
Railroad Co. v. State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 876, 
879 (Utah 1992). "Reasonableness," however, is not 
the only possible standard of review under subsection 
16(4)(h)(ii). Where a petitioner asserts that the 
agency's action is contrary to the agency's rule 
because the agency incorrectly interpreted the rule, 
we apply a correction-of-error standard, unless the 
agency has *684 been granted discretion to interpret 
related statutory terms. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 593 n. 62 (Utah 1991). 
In Union Pacific, the supreme court only addressed 
the standard for reviewing an agency's "application" 
of a rule to the facts. It was not presented with a 
claim that the agency had departed from its own rules. 
Nevertheless, the court gratuitously stated that since 
"courts should uphold agency rules if they are 
reasonable and rational, courts should also uphold 
reasonable and rational departures from those 
rules...." 842 P.2d at 879 (citation omitted). The 
apparent discrepancy between this broad statement 
and other supreme court holdings should be clarified. 
It does not logically follow that an agency has 
discretion to violate its own rules simply because it 
had discretion to make those rules. The supreme 
court itself has declared that agencies must follow 
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their own rules. 
[Administrative regulations are presumed to be 
reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or 
followed by the agency to suit its own purposes. 
Such is the essence of arbitrary and capricious 
action. Without compelling grounds for not 
following its rules, an agency must be held to them. 
Department of Community Affairs v. Merit System 
Council 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 1980). 
The misleading language in Union Pacific 
contradicts the language of subsection 16(4)(h)(ii) 
itself, which expressly states that relief may be 
granted if agency action is "contrary" to agency rule. 
The legislature did not direct that relief may be 
granted only if the agency action is "unreasonably 
contrary" to agency rule. Reasonable or not, a 
departure from an agency rule is by definition 
"contrary" to the rule. 
Inasmuch as a departure from a rule effectively 
constitutes a rule change, the supreme court's dicta 
also contradicts the Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act. The Act anticipates that once an agency adopts a 
rule it must abide by the rule, unless it exercises its 
rulemaking authority to amend the rule. See sections 
63-46a-3(8), and -9(2) (regarding nile amendments). 
Any agency subject to the Administrative 
Rulemaking Act promulgating a rule must follow the 
procedures specified. See Williams v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986) 
(interpreting the Utah Rule Making Act, the 
predecessor to the Administrative Rulemaking Act). 
The Administrative Rulemaking Act requires rule 
making whenever "agency actions affect a class of 
persons" Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(3)(a) (1986), 
and defines a rule as "a statement made by an 
agency that applies to a general class of persons, 
rather than specific persons ... [which] implements 
or interprets policy made by statute...." Id. at § 
63-46a-2(8). 
Ellis v. State Retirement Bd., 757 P.2d 882, 887 
(Utah App. 1988). See also Lane v. Board of Rev. of 
Indus. Comm'n, 111 P.2d 206, 208 (Utah 1986) 
(agency rules are not valid and cannot "provide a 
lawful basis" for agency decisions until the agency 
complies with the rulemaking process). 
The mere application of the law to the facts of a case 
does not constitute rulemaking. Ellis, 757 P.2d at 
887. If, on the other hand, an agency seeks to 
change "clear law" so as to develop a new rule of law 
that will have general application, it may do so only 
through the rulemaking process. See Williams v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773, 776 (Utah 1986) 
(quoting 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 
7:25, at 122 (2d ed. 1978)). Clarifying 
"interpretations" of rules that have general application 
(and are therefore de facto new rules) may be made 
through administrative adjudication only if the law at 
issue is "uncertain." Williams, 720 P.2d at 776. 
Once an administrative ruling of law is made in a 
formal adjudication, however, it constitutes stare 
decisis and the agency is bound by it just as if it were 
a formally adopted rule. Salt Lake Citizens Congress 
v. Mountain States Tel & Tel, 846 P.2d 1245, 
1252-53 (Utah 1992); see also Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46a-3(6) (1989) ("Each agency shall enact rules 
incorporating *685. the principles of law not already 
in its rules that are established by final adjudicative 
decisions within 120 days after the decision is 
announced in its cases."). 
Since an agency may "depart" from its established 
rules only through the process outlined in the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, we cannot logically 
defer to such departures, reasonable or not, when they 
occur by means of agency adjudications. 
Consequently, the supreme court's analytical dicta in 
Union Pacific should not be confused with the actual 
holding in that case, i.e., that an agency's application 
of its rules is reviewed for reasonableness. 
Since Holland is challenging only the CSRB's 
application of rule R468-5-4. (3), (and not its 
interpretation of the rule), I concur with the main 
opinion's use of the reasonableness standard and agree 
that CSRB's application of the rule was reasonable. 
(FN1.) Holland also argues that the Career Service 
Review Board violated his reappointment rights 
under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-17 (1986), which 
provides, in relevant part: 
Any career service employee accepting an 
appointment to an exempt position who is not 
retained by the appointing officer ... shall: 
(1) be appointed to any career service position for 
which the employee qualifies in a pay grade 
comparable to the employee's last position in the 
career service.... 
However, this section is plainly inapplicable to 
Holland because he never accepted an appointment 
to an exempt position in which he was not retained 
by the appointing officer. Accordingly, we decline 
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to address this argument on review. 
(FN2.) Additionally, the respondents argue that Utah 
Code Admin.P. R468-12-3. (7)(a) (1991) also 
grants DHRM discretion to determine a RIF'd 
employee's eligibility for reinstatement. However, 
since this argument is raised for the first time on 
review, we do not address it. See, e.g., Aha Indus. 
Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1291-92 (Utah 1993). 
(FN3.) The parties do not dispute that Holland met 
the minimum qualifications for the graphic arts 
specialist position in question; thus, we limit our 
discussion of this rule to DHRM's application of the 
term, "the same salary range." 
(FN4.) Indeed, to hold otherwise would mean that 
any employee that has been incorrectly graded on 
the statewide reappointment register would 
thereafter have a right to a position to which he or 
she is, in fact, ineligible. Creation of such a rule 
would have a substantial adverse effect on public 
policy, and thus, would be an improper use of 
equitable estoppel. See Utah State Univ., 646 P.2d 
at 718. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Clifford (Rusty) ANDERSON, dba Image Limousine, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
No. 910166. 
July 1, 1992. 
Authorized common carrier of passengers for hire 
sought review of Public Service Commission order 
revoking his certificate of convenience and necessity. 
The Supreme Court, Durham, J,, held that: (1) 
Commission adequately complied with notice and 
hearing requirements; (2) Commission did not act in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner in cancelling 
certificate; and (3) Commission was not estopped 
from revoking certificate. 
Affirmed. 
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Public Service Commission's interest in ensuring 
that parties did not delay or subvert administrative 
process by willfully evading notice authorized placing 
lower burden on agency in giving notice of possible 
adverse actions, justifying service by certified mail 
rather than personal service. 
[6] Administrative Law and Procedure @^513 
15A — 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative 
Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15Ak513 Administrative Review. 
[See headnote text below] 
[6] Carriers <®=*8 
70 — 
701 Control and Regulation of Common Carriers 
701(A) In General 
70k8 Licenses and Taxes. 
Public Service Commission did not act in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner by amending 
administrative law judge's recommendation that 
penalty be suspended, concluding instead that the full 
$500 fine was warranted and that certificate would be 
revoked if the fine was not paid within 60 days, in 
light of the carrier's history of past violations. 
U.C.A.1953, 54-6*4(1). 
[7] Estoppel <§=*62.2(2) 
156 — 
156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or 
Public Officers 
156k62.2 States and United States 
156k62.2(2) Particular State Officers, Agencies 
or Proceedings. 
Public Service Commission was not estopped from 
revoking common carrier's certificate of convenience 
and necessity on the theory that he had entered into an 
alleged settlement agreement with an assistant 
Attorney General; although record indicated there 
was some negotiations between certificate holder and 
assistant Attorney General regarding fines owed by 
holder, certificate holder merely claimed in his 
attorney's own letter that some sort of agreement may 
have been reached, but did not point to specific 
representation made by commission or by assistant 
Attorney General. 
*823 Joseph N. Nemelka, Murray, for Anderson. 
R. Paul Van Dam, David L. Stott, Salt Lake City, 
for Public Service Com'n. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Petitioner Clifford Anderson (dba Image Limousine) 
is an authorized common carrier of passengers for 
hire. He seeks review of a Public Service 
Commission order revoking his certificate of 
convenience and necessity. Anderson challenges the 
Commission's order on the grounds that (1) the 
Commission failed to comply with the notice and 
hearing requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-41, 
(2) the Commission acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner in cancelling Anderson's 
certificate, and (3) the Commission is estopped from 
revoking Anderson's certificate. We reject all of 
petitioner's contentions and affirm the Commission's 
order. 
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I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Anderson has a fairly long history of appearances 
before the Public Service Commission. His most 
recent violation, for which the Commission 
subsequently revoked his certificate, involved a failure 
to maintain on file with the Commission proof of 
insurance coverage, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 
54-6-42, In August 1990, Image allowed its insurance 
to lapse for twelve days. On October 18, 1990, an 
administrative law judge conducted a hearing in which 
Anderson was required to show cause why Image 
"should not be subjected to sanctions and/or the 
suspension or cancellation of its Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity" for its insurance lapse. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the administrative 
law judge recommended that Anderson be fined $500 
for the insurance violation but that the fine be 
suspended on the condition that Anderson pay a 
suspended portion of a previously imposed fine within 
180 days and that Anderson complete a two-year 
probation without further violation. The Commission 
reviewed the administrative law judge's proposed 
order but found the penalty inadequate in light of 
Anderson's history of violations. Consequently, on 
November 9, 1990, the Commission overruled the 
administrative law judge's proposed order. Instead, 
the Commission ordered Anderson to "pay the 
$500.00 fine within 60 days of the date of this order 
or his Certificate of Convenience and Necessity will 
be cancelled without farther notice. * 
The Commission sent a copy of the November 9 
order by certified mail to the address Anderson had 
designated as that at which service of process may be 
made and orders may be delivered. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-6-14 (1990). The mail carrier made several 
attempts to deliver the order, but Anderson failed to 
claim his mail. Consequently, the post office returned 
the order to the Commission unclaimed. Anderson 
did not pay the $500 fine by January 9, and on 
February 7, 1991, the Commission issued an order 
revoking Image's certificate of convenience and 
necessity. The Commission, again by certified mail, 
sent Anderson a copy of the order of revocation. It 
too was returned unclaimed. 
On March 14, 1991, after the expiration of the 
statutory review period, Anderson petitioned the 
Commission for a rehearing of the cancellation order. 
The Commission denied the petition. Anderson 
subsequently filed a petition for a writ of review with 
this court. 
*824 n . STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Subsection 63-46b-16(4) of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("UAPA") outlines the circumstances 
under which a reviewing court may grant relief from 
formal agency action. Under 63-46b-16(4)(d), we 
may grant relief if "the agency has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law." Anderson's 
allegation that the Commission failed to comply with 
the notice and hearing requirements of section 54-6-41 
falls under this rubric. Under UAPA, as in other 
contexts, when reviewing an application or 
interpretation of law we use a correction of error 
standard, giving no deference to the Commission's 
interpretation of the law. See Savage Indus, v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 1991). But 
see Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991) (if 
agency has been granted discretion in interpreting 
specific term, we review agency's interpretation/ 
application under reasonableness standard). 
Anderson's second claim, that the Commission acted 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it revised 
the administrative law judge's proposed order, is 
reviewable under subsection 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv). We 
review claims that an agency action was arbitrary and 
capricious for reasonableness. See Sisco Hike v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). 
IE. NOTICE AND HEARING 
Anderson contends that the Commission failed to 
comply with the notice and hearing requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-41, thereby depriving him of 
due process in the revocation of his license. (FN1) 
Section 54-6-41 states, "The commission may at any 
time for good cause, and after notice and hearing, 
suspend, alter, amend, or revoke any certificate, 
permit, or license issued by it under this chapter. * 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-41 (1990). Although 
Anderson admits he was afforded a hearing on the 
matter mat led to the revocation of his certificate, he 
argues that this hearing and the subsequent notices the 
Commission sent him regarding the future status of 
his license were insufficient to comport with the due 
process standards inherent in section 54-6-41. 
We first address Anderson's contentions that the 
Commission did not conduct sufficient hearings before 
cancelling Anderson's certificate. Anderson points 
out that in the October 18, 1990 hearing, the 
administrative law judge focused only on Anderson's 
failure to maintain insurance coverage and not on 
whether his license should be revoked. Anderson 
argues that after the Commission amended the 
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administrative law judge's recommended order and 
before it revoked his certificate, the Commission 
should have conducted another hearing directly 
addressing whether his certificate should be revoked. 
(FN2) His argument is merit less. 
[1] After Anderson allowed his insurance to lapse, 
the Commission sent him an order to show cause 
(HOSC") requiring him to "appear before the 
Commission and show cause why [Image's] 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity ... should 
not be suspended or cancelled...." The notice 
provided to Anderson advising him of the OSC 
hearing unambiguously informed him that the purpose 
of the hearing was to determine why his certificate 
should not be revoked. An administrative law judge 
conducted a hearing on the OSC at which Anderson 
appeared and defended his position. Such a hearing, 
focusing on the violation for which a license is later 
suspended and the notice which informs the parties of 
the nature of the potential penalty involved, clearly 
comports with the hearing requirement set forth in 
section 54-6-41. 
•825 [2] Anderson further alleges that the 
Commission gave him insufficient notice of its 
modifications of the administrative law judge's 
proposed order. He contends that when the 
Commission received his returned order, it had a duty 
to take additional steps to ensure that he got actual 
notice of the amended order (i.e., the order that 
required him to pay the full $500 penalty within 60 
days or have his certificate revoked automatically). 
This argument is unpersuasive. Section 54-6-14 of 
the Motor Carrier Act mandates that all common and 
contract motor carriers maintain on file with the 
Commission "written designation of the name and 
post office address of a person maintaining a 
residence within this state upon whom service of any 
process, notice, or order may be made under this 
chapter/ Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-14 (1990). The 
statute further provides, "Service of process shall be 
by certified mail to the designated person at the 
address filed." Id. The statute makes no reference to 
any sort of personal service or actual notice 
requirement. The most burdensome form of service 
articulated is certified mail. Thus, we can infer that, 
at most, the legislature intended that the Commission 
be obligated to serve its orders by certified mail, not 
by personal service. 
[31 Despite the statute's apparent approval of serving 
orders by certified mail, Anderson argues that he is 
constitutionally entitled to actual notice of 
Commission orders. We do not believe that the 
Constitution requires actual notice under these 
circumstances. 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank <£ Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 313-14, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57, 94 
L.Ed. 865 (1950), the United States Supreme Court 
held that to comport with due process, notice must be 
"reasonably calculated under all the circumstances" to 
give interested parties an opportunity to protect their 
interests. Under this standard, the proper inquiry 
focuses on whether the agency "acted reasonably in 
selecting means likely to inform persons affected, not 
whether each [affected person] actually received 
notice." Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 
649 (2d Cir. 1988). To determine whether the agency 
has acted reasonably in choosing a method of notice, 
we balance the interest sought to be protected against 
the interest of the agency. Tulsa Professional 
Collection Servs. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484, 
108 S.Ct. 1340, 1344, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); 
Carbon v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1273-74 (Utah 1987). 
In undertaking this analysis, we focus on whether the 
method of service strikes a reasonable balance 
between the interests of the agency and the affected 
individual, see Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 484, 108 S.Ct. at 
1344, while keeping in mind that the state's burden is 
less onerous in administrative proceedings. See 
Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 602 
(Utah 1980) (Hall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he sufficiency 
of 'notice' fDr due process purposes is more limited in 
administrative matters than in other areas of the 
law."). 
In the instant case, Anderson's interest lies ia a 
certificate of convenience and necessity for operating 
a limousine service. It appears that the limousine 
service is Ajoderson's source of livelihood. As such, 
it represents a significant interest. On the other hand, 
the agency has an interest in controlling the level of 
its administrative burden in delivering orders to 
parties. The current practice of delivering orders via 
certified mail does not place an undue burden on the 
Commission. Unlike personal service, which would 
require substantial time and expense, certified mad is 
far less costly and less personnel-intensive; 
nevertheless, it is a reliable method of notice. See, 
e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 397-98, 34 
S.Ct. 779, 784, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914) (commenting 
on skill of postal workers in effecting delivery); 
Hoffman v. National Equip. Rental, Ltd., 643 F.2d 
987, 990 (4th Cir. 1981) (presuming notice-bearing 
letters reach destination). 
[4] Furthermore, the nature and purpose of the 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
839 P.2d 822, Anderson v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, (Utah 1992) Page 5 
relationship between certificate holders and the 
Commission support the adequacy of this type of 
notice. When the Commission grants a certificate of 
convenience and necessity, it gives an individual the 
authority to operate in a designated *826 business 
(e.g., common carriers). This certificate does not 
represent an unrestricted right. Rather, the 
Commission may impose reasonable conditions with 
which the certificate holder must comply in return for 
the privilege of retaining the certificate. See, e.g., 
73B CJ.S. Public Utilities § 69, at 328-29 (1983) 
("[CJommission may, in the public interest ... annex 
reasonable conditions or limitations to the certificate 
of convenience and necessity."); 53 CJ.S. Licenses 
§ 41, at 383 (1987) (holder must comply with 
conditions imposed to be entitled to license); 51 
Am.Jur.2d Licenses and Permits § 45, at 52 (1970) 
("[CJontinuance of license privileges may require the 
satisfaction of certain requirements."). The 
Commission regulates and supervises the certificate 
holder to ensure that the holder is in compliance with 
the conditions of his or her certificate. This 
regulatory function requires ongoing communication 
between the Commission and certificate holders; it is 
entirely reasonable to require certificate holders to 
make themselves available to receive regular 
communications. Thus, the ongoing nature of the 
relationship with certificate holders suggests that the 
Commission's burden in effecting notice is somewhat 
less onerous in this context than it might be outside 
the regulatory setting. 
[5] In addition, the agency also has a significant 
interest in ensuring that parties do not delay or 
subvert the administrative process by willfully evading 
notice. If an actual notice standard were required for 
delivery of Commission orders, parties might be 
encouraged to evade notice. A party fearing an 
adverse outcome could simply refuse to claim his or 
her mail and then avoid personal service. Such a 
result would be unacceptable. Although some 
individuals may fail to receive notice through no fault 
of their own, it would be extremely burdensome to 
require the Commission to undertake factual 
determinations of willfulness and fault in every failure 
to receive notice. 
The legislature appears to have recognized the risk 
of willful evasion. Consequently, it has placed the 
bulk of the burden of ensuring notice on the certificate 
holders. Section 54-6-14 of the Motor Carrier Act 
provides, "Every common and contract motor carrier 
shall file with the commission a written designation of 
the name and post office address of a person 
maintaining a residence within this state upon whom 
service of any process, notice, or order may be 
made." Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-14 (1990). This 
requirement of rrmintaining a current address on file 
with the Commission, with the implicit corollary of 
making a diligent effort to collect mail sent to that 
address, is a reasonable burden on the benefit of 
holding a certificate of convenience and necessity. 
This is particularly true for notice involving orders. 
Orders generally are sent after the parry has been 
involved in some proceeding before the Commission 
or administrative law judge. Thus, the party is aware 
that actions are or may be pending. The party is 
aware that communications from the Commission 
likely will ensue, and therefore, the party should be 
diligent in retrieving any correspondence from the 
Commission. 
Given the potential administrative burden and the 
risk of willful evasion inherent in an actual notice 
standard, we believe that the use of certified mail to 
deliver Commission orders strikes a proper balance 
between the interests of the certificate holder and the 
interests of the agency. Although certified mail will 
not ensure actual notice in all cases, it is a method 
reasonably calculated to inform certificate holders of 
Commission orders. 
IV. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS CONDUCT 
[6] Anderson contends that the Commission acted in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner by amending the 
administrative law judge's recommended order. He 
argues that because the Commission members were 
not present at the hearing and thus could not observe 
Anderson's demeanor, they did not have a sufficient 
basis for amending the administrative law judge's 
recommendations. We disagree. The Commission, 
after reviewing the record and considering Anderson's 
history of violations, *827 concluded that the full 
$500 fine was warranted and that if it was not paid 
within 60 days, his certificate would be revoked. The 
Commission's penalty was well within the range of 
penalties allowed under section 54-6a-4(l). In fact, a 
$500 penalty is at the low end of the permissible 
scale. Considering Anderson's long history of 
violations, it was reasonable for the Commission to 
impose a stiffer penalty than the administrative law 
judge recommended. Thus, we hold that the 
Commission's action was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious. 
V. ESTOPPEL 
[7] Finally, Anderson contends that the Commission 
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should be estopped from revoking his certificate 
because he had entered into an alleged settlement 
agreement with an assistant attorney general. In 
December 1990, the attorney general's office 
instituted legal proceedings against Anderson for 
failure to pay the fine on his prior violation (Docket 
No. 90-841-01). Subsequently, Anderson and an 
assistant attorney general, Mr. Tanner, began 
negotiations to settle all the fines Anderson owed. 
(FN3) Neither the parties nor the record indicates the 
exact nature of these negotiations. It does appear, 
however, that while the negotiations were in progress, 
the Commission revoked Anderson's certificate. 
Anderson argues that certain representations were 
made during the course of the negotiations that should 
estop the Commission from revoking his certificate. 
Anderson rests his claim on a letter his attorney sent 
to Mr. Tanner on February 19, 1991, stating, "It is 
my understanding from our previous telephone 
conversations that if [my client] pays another $250.00 
on or before May 9, 1991, then all of the matters 
currently pending will be resolved." He makes no 
further allegations of specific representations made to 
him. Anderson's estoppel claim fails because it does 
not meet the high standard of proof required for 
estoppel against the government. 
As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked 
against a governmental entity. Utah State Univ. v. 
Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). In 
Utah, there is a limited exception to this general 
principle for "unusual circumstances 'where it is plain 
that the interests of justice so require.' " Eldredge v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990) (quoting Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d at 720). 
This exception applies, however, only if "the facts 
may be found with such certainty, and the injustice 
suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the 
exception." Sutro <£ Co., 646 P.2d at 720. 
The few cases in which Utah courts have permitted 
estoppel against the government have involved veiy 
specific written representations by authorized 
government entities. For example, in Celebrity Club, 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 
689 (Utah 1979), an applicant for a liquor license 
inquired whether its proposed location would comply 
with a statutory requirement that it not be located 
within "600 feet of any public or private school, 
church, library, public playground or park...." Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-6-13.5 (repealed 1985). The Liquor 
Control Commission responded with a written 
representation that "the location of the proposed liquor 
store in your proposed private club facility satisfies 
the 600 foot requirement." Celebrity Club, Inc., 602 
P.2d at 691. In reliance on this explicit 
representation, the applicant expended roughly 
$200,000 to complete the club. In a subsequent 
dispute over the issuance of the license, the court held 
that the Commission was estopped from denying the 
license for violation of the statute. 
Similarly, in Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct.App.1990), a representative of 
the Utah State Retirement Office assured a county 
employee that he would receive credit toward 
retirement for over six years of service he had 
accrued prior to a temporary break in his employment 
with the county. Representatives of the retirement 
office made oral and written statements assuring 
Eldredge *828. that he would be credited with the 
years in question. Eldredge, 795 P.2d at 672-73. 
Relying on these explicit representations, Eldredge 
chose to participate in an early retirement option. The 
court held that the county was later estopped from 
denying Eldredge credit for the improperly credited 
years. Id. ait 678. 
These cases involved very clear, well-substantiated 
representations by government entities. There was no 
such representation here. All we have is Anderson's 
claim, in his own attorney's letter, that some sort of 
agreement may have been reached. Anderson points 
to no specific statement or written representation 
made by either the Commission or Mr. Tanner that 
could rise to the standard required under Sutro & Co. 
Consequently, his estoppel claim fails. 
Anderson has not demonstrated that the Commission 
failed to comply with the notice and hearing 
requirements of section 54-6-41, that the 
Commission's action was arbitrary or capricious, or 
that the Commission should be estopped from 
revoking his certificate. Thus, we affirm the 
Commission's revocation of Anderson's certificate. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
(FN1.) The parties did not brief or argue this case 
under article I,§ 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore, we do not analyze § 54-6-41 under the 
State's due process clause. 
(FN2.) In his brief, however, Anderson 
acknowledges that due process does not "necessarily 
require a hearing at any particular point in the 
administrative proceeding as long as the requisite 
hearing is held before the final order becomes 
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effective. * Vali Convalescent & Care Inst. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 649 P.2d 33, 36 (Utah 1982). 
(FN3.) Although it is unclear from the record, it 
appears that by this time, Anderson had learned of 
the Commission's amendment of the administrative 
law judge's proposed order. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE 
AND APPLIED SCIENCE, a 
Utah body politic and corporate, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
SUTRO Sc CO.; Bear Stearns & Co.; Hornblower & 
Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & 
Smith; Bosworth, Sullivan & Co.; and Shearson, 
Hammill& 
Co., Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
Phillip A. BULLEN, et al., Thinl-Party Defendants. 
Nos. 16274, 16275, 16276, 16277, 16278, 16279, 
16285, 16286, 
16287, 16288, 16289, 16290, 16291, 16292, 16294, 
16295, 16296 and 16297. 
May 5, 1982. 
Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied 
Science sued stock brokers to recover losses sustained 
as result of program of investments carried on through 
the brokers, in which brokers filed counterclaims and 
third-party claims against university officials and 
members of its institution council seeking indemnity. 
The First District Court, Cache County, VeNoy 
Christofferson, J., denied defendants' motions to 
dismiss, granted plaintiffs motion for partial 
summary judgment and dismissed counterclaims on 
third-party actions. Brokers' petitions for 
intermediate appeal were granted. The Supreme 
Court, Crockett, Retired J., held that: (1) although 
lawfulness of investing state funds in common stocks 
was in doubt, plaintiff was not necessarily estopped 
from repudiating officials' representations that they 
were authorized to engage in common stock 
transactions; (2) absent allegation of bad faith or 
willful intention of wrongdoing, University officials 
and council members were entitled to cloak of 
qualified immunity; (3) activities of Logan banks on 
behalf of nonresident brokers was sufficient to subject 
latter to personal jurisdiction; and (4) venue lay in 
Cache County where delivery of stocks and payment 
therefore occurred. 
Remanded for further proceedings. 
West Headnotes 
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[1] Appeal and Error <@^846(5) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k844 Review Dependent on Mode of Trial in 
Lower Court 
30k846 Trial by Court in General 
30k846(5) Necessity of Finding Facts. 
Where rulings on appeal, i.e., denial of defendants' 
motions to dismiss, granting of plaintiffs motions to 
partial summary judgment on ground that defendants 
were liable as a matter of law and dismissing 
counterclaims and third-party actions, were made 
without giving defense an opportunity to present 
evidence and have findings of fact, reviewing court 
accepted defendants' assertions as true although the 
exposition of facts in that light was no indication as to 
how the disputed facts would be resolved on trial. 
[2] Brokers®^ 19 
65 — 
65IV Duties and Liability to Principal 
65kl9 Nature of Broker's Obligation. 
Stock brokers have an especially high degree of care 
to ascertain the authority of a trustee dealing with 
public hinds. 
[3] Estoppel <@ >^62.1 
156 — 
156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or 
Public Officers 
156k62.1 In General. 
In applying estoppel against a government entity a 
distinction is drawn between contracts or activities 
which are either mala in se or which are strictly 
prohibited by statute and thus may be strongly against 
public policy, as compared to activities which, though 
not authorized by law, are not inherently evil and in 
the former class of cases, it is universally held that no 
estoppel will lie whereas in activities which are 
merely ultra vires the courts are more likely to allow 
such a defense and this is also true of situations when 
the government entity engages in proprietary or 
business activities. 
[4] Estoppel <®==>62.1 
156.— 
156m Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or 
Public Officers 
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156k62.1 In General. 
Rule precluding assertion of estoppel against a 
government is sound and generally should be applied, 
except only in appropriate circumstances where the 
interests of justice mandate an exception to that 
general rule, and in cases where such an issue arises 
the critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts 
may be found with such certainty and the injustice to 
be suffered is of sufficient gravity to invoke the 
exception and doubt should be resolved in favor of 
permitting the party to have a trial of the issue. 
[5] Estoppel <®^62.2(2) 
156 — 
156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k62 Estoppel Against Public, Government, or 
Public Officers 
156k62.2 States and United States 
156k62.2(2) Particular State Officers, Agencies 
or Proceedings. 
It could not be said as a matter of law that defendant 
stock brokers were liable for losses sustained by State 
University of Agriculture and Applied Science as 
result of program of common stock investments 
carried on through the brokers where brokers 
contended that they requested and received resolutions 
of institutional council as to its authority to invest in 
common stocks notwithstanding that by law such 
investments may have been prohibited, and whether 
the University was estopped from repudiating its 
representations of authority was to be determined 
from the facts. U.C.A.1953, 33-1-1. 
[6] Judgment <®=^181(4) 
228 — 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228kl81 Grounds for Summary Judgment 
228kl81(4) Necessity That Right to Judgment Be 
Free from Doubt. 
In view of constitutional guarantee of access to the 
courts for protection of rights and redress of wrongs, 
summary judgment, which denies opportunity for 
trial, should be granted only when it clearly appears 
that there is no reasonable probability that the party 
moved against could prevail. Const. Art. 1, § 11. 
[7] Officers and Public Employees <®^114 
283 — 
283DI Rights, Powers, Duties, and Liabilities 
283kll4 Liabilities for Official Acts. 
Generally recognized doctrine of law is that public 
officials are protected by qualified immunity from 
suits growing out of performance of lawfully 
authorized discretionary duties, so long as they are 
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acting in good, faith and are not guilty of any willful or 
intentional wrongdoing. 
[8] Officers and Public Employees <@^114 
283 -— 
283III Rights, Powers, Duties, and Liabilities 
283kll4 Liabilities for Official Acts. 
When a public official acts in good faith in 
performance of discretionary duties he is not liable in 
damages merely because he may make a mistake in 
judgment. 
[9] Colleges and Universities <®=>7 
81 — 
81k7 Governing Boards and Officers. 
Officials of the Utah State University of Agriculture 
and Applied Science and individual members of the 
institution council could not be held liable to 
indemnify *715 defendant stock brokers for any 
damages that might be assessed against brokers in 
university's damages action arising out of investment 
of state funds in common stock where there was no 
allegation that council members acted in bad faith or 
committed any willful or intentional wrong and in 
spite of errors in judgment no one questioned that 
council members acted in accordance with their then 
best judgment for the benefit of the institution. 
U.C.A.1953, 33-1-1. 
[10] Principal and Agent <®=^ 15 
308 — 
3081 The Relation 
3081(A) Creation and Existence 
308kl5 Joint Principals. 
It is not necessarily true that a party acting as agent 
in a transaction must be exclusively agent of one party 
or the other and when he is requested and performs 
duty for each, with knowledge and consent of both, he 
may well be considered as agent for each for the 
particular services he renders that principal. 
[11] Courts <®=* 12(2.5) 
106 — 
1061 Nature, Extent, and Exercise of Jurisdiction in 
General 
106kl0 Jurisdiction of the Person 
106kl2 Domicile or Residence of Party 
106kl2(2) Actions by or Against Nonresidents; 
"Long-Arm" Jurisdiction in General 
106kl2(2.5) Contacts with Forum State. 
(Formerly 106kl2(2)) 
Insofar as Utah banks performed duties for and at 
direction of nonresident brokers the banks acted as 
brokers agent and the number of transactions was 
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sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction over brokers 
in state University's action to recover for losses 
sustained as result of program of investments carried 
on to the brokers, with two Logan banks authorized to 
receive stock certificates sent by brokers, to be 
exchanged for proceeds of drafts payable to brokers. 
[12] Venue <®^>8.2 
401 — 
4011 Nature or Subject of Action 
401k8 Actions for Torts 
401k8.2 Particular Torts. 
(Formerly 401k8(2)) 
Although Salt Lake County was where defendant 
brokers accepted orders and executed purchases of 
stock for plaintiff, venue of action to recover losses 
sustained as a result of program of investments 
carried on through the brokers laid in Cache County 
where the transactions were actually consummated by 
delivery of stock and payment therefor in Logan 
banks and such delivery and payment constituted the 
alleged wrongful acts. 
[13] Appeal and Error <@=^ 965 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k963 Proceedings Preliminary to Trial 
30k965 Change of Venue. 
[See headnote text below] 
[13] Venue <®=^ 42 
401 — 
401III Change of Venue or Place of Trial 
401k42 Discretion of Court. 
When venue may properly he in more than one 
county the trial court has considerable discretion in 
acting on a motion for change and its ruling will not 
be disturbed absent a clear abuse thereof. 
*717 Harold G. Christensen, R. Brent Stephens, 
Dee V. Benson, Salt Lake City, for Bosworth. 
Keith E. Taylor, Daniel M. Allred, Kathlene W. 
Lowe, Salt Lake City, for Sutro. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
USU, plaintiff and respondent. 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., H. Wayne Wadsworth, 
Michael F. Heyrend, Salt Lake City, John W. 
Morrison, David R. Melton, Chicago, 111., Lyle W. 
Hillyard, Logan, Darwin Hansen, Bountiful, for third-
party defendants. 
CROCKETT, Retired Justice: 
These actions were brought on behalf of Utah State 
University of Agriculture and Applied Science (herein 
referred to as USU) against the five named 
defendants, who are brokers and dealers in stocks and 
securities (herein referred to as the brokers), to 
recover losses sustained by USU as a result of a 
program of investments carried on through the 
brokers between September, 1970, and March, 1973. 
The brokers denied liability, filed counterclaims and 
also filed third-party claims against the named USU 
officials and members of the USU Institutional 
Council (herein referred to as the Council members) 
seeking indemnity for any losses that may be assessed 
against the brokers. 
Pursuant to motions, the trial court entered the 
following orders: denied defendants' motions to 
dismiss; granted USU's motion for partial summary 
judgment against defendant brokers, ruling that they 
are liable as a matter of law; and dismissed the 
defendants' counterclaims and their third-party actions 
against the Institutional Council members. This Court 
granted the brokers' petitions for intermediate appeal, 
in which these actions are combined. 
[1] In view of the fact that the rulings under attack 
were made by the trial court as a matter of law, 
without giving the brokers an opportunity to present 
evidence and have findings of fact made thereon, for 
the purpose of this review we accept their assertions 
as true, ([FN1]) but we expressly note that in our 
exposition of facts in that light we do not desire to 
indicate any view as to how the disputed issues of fact 
may be resolved upon a trial thereof. 
Motivated by a desire to better manage USU's 
financial resources, in the summer of 1970 its 
Institutional Council decided upon and launched what 
is referred to as an "aggressive program" of investing 
in stocks, which led to opening accounts with the 
defendant brokers. It adopted resolutions authorizing 
dealings in stocks and securities by its vice-president, 
Dee A. Broadbent, and Donald A. Catron, controller. 
The brokers aver that it was at the request of these 
USU officials that they engaged in dealing in the 
stocks. 
[2] It is not to be questioned that the defendants, 
who are licensed to render service as brokers, must be 
deemed to have and use specialized knowledge, 
experience and integrity in rendering that service; and 
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more specifically here, that they have an especially 
high degree of care to ascertain the authority of a 
trustee (plaintiff) dealing with public hinds. Upon 
trial, there will be an issue as to what those standards 
are, and the extent to which the brokers discharged 
the high responsibilities which the law imposes upon 
them. The brokers contend that they discharged their 
duties in accordance with the standards of their 
business, in ascertaining the authority of USU to so 
invest its funds; that they requested and received the 
resolutions of the Council indicating such authority; 
that they acted in good faith upon the resolutions and 
assurances given to them as to the University's 
authority to invest its funds for its potential benefit; 
and that they did nothing other than "to scrupulously, 
fairly, and diligently carry out instructions given 
them" by the Council and its agents authorized for 
that purpose; and that in the hundreds of *718 
transactions over a period of 3 years they acted only 
as conduits, transferring the stocks from various 
principals to USU and vice versa, and only in 
relatively few instances were themselves principals, 
selling the stocks to USU. 
During the first two years, while the stock market 
was rising, the investment program prospered and 
everyone concerned seemed to be happy about the 
situation. However, in the fall of 1972 there was a 
recession in the stock market and there were 
substantial declines in values of stocks owned by the 
University. In late November, 1972, during the 
course of an independent audit, the Attorney General 
was requested for an opinion as to the legality of the 
investments. On December 15, 1972, he issued an 
opinion that it was not lawful for the University to 
invest state funds in securities not expressly 
authorized in Sec. 33-1-1, U.C.A. 1953, which does 
not include common stocks. Acting thereon, at its 
next meeting in January, 1973, the Board of Higher 
Education instructed the USU Council by letter to 
liquidate all securities not expressly authorized by that 
statute. However, it appears that Mr. Catron did not 
fully comply with that mandate immediately; and that 
information was not officially transmitted to the 
brokers until March of 1973. 
As a result of the losses incurred in the liquidation 
process, these suits were brought against the 
defendant brokers seeking to recoup losses running 
into millions of dollars on the ground that their 
contracts with the University had been illegal and 
void. 
Principal among the issues raised by the brokers is 
their contention that the trial court erred in ruling that 
they could not assert estoppel against USU, a 
governmental institution, and that they are liable for 
its losses as a matter of law. They argue that this 
results in a grave injustice to them procedurally: it 
allows plaintiff USU to repudiate its representations 
made to them; to have the advantage of their services 
without compensation; to accept the benefits of the 
investment program and disavow the losses; then to 
arbitrarily impose the losses on defendant brokers; all 
this without giving the brokers any opportunity to 
prove their contentions. The brokers essay the 
position that their evidence will convince any 
fairminded trier of facts that to apply the rule that 
estoppel does not apply against the government would 
result in such obvious and serious injustice as to bring 
this case within the well-recognized exception to that 
general rule. 
We havfe no doubt about the soundness nor the 
salutary purpose of the rule that estoppel generally is 
not assertable against the government or governmental 
institutions. ([FN2]) There are good and sufficient 
reasons for that rule, including the safeguarding of the 
interests of the public, which are often somewhat in 
hazard because of the vagaries of political tides, 
frequent changes of public officials, the possibility of 
collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up by 
law, then suing for the value of goods furnished or 
services rendered. Notwithstanding our approval of 
that nile, like most general rules, there are exceptions 
when its rigid application would defeat, rather than 
serve, the higher purpose that all rules are intended to 
serve: that of doing justice. ([FN3]) The rule is 
therefore applied when it will serve that purpose. But 
in unusual circumstances, when it is plainly apparent 
that its application would result in injustice, and there 
would be no substantial adverse effect on public 
policy, the courts will honor the higher purpose of 
doing justice by invoking the exception, rather than 
departing from that desired objective in slavish 
adherence to a general rule. ([FN4]) 
•719 [3] In addressing the question whether under 
any state of facts that may be found in this case the 
defense of estoppel may be applied, there are some 
observations to be made. The first is that there is a 
distinction to be drawn between contracts or activities 
which are either malum in se, or which are strictly 
prohibited by statute, and thus may be strongly against 
public policy, as compared to activities such as those 
of concern here which, though not authorized by law, 
are not inherently evil. In the former class of cases, it 
is quite universally held that no estoppel will he 
against the government, whereas in activities which 
are merely ultra vires the courts are more likely to 
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allow such a defense; and this is also true of situations 
when the governmental entity engages in proprietary 
or business activities. ([FN5]) In this case, the 
activities with which we are concerned were business 
activities. That activities such as those in question 
here were ultra vires has been adjudged in our case of 
First Equity Corp. v. Utah State University, ([FN6]) 
but the plaintiffs reliance on that case as squarely 
supporting its position here is misplaced. The holding 
there was that because the contract was ultra vires the 
broker could not enforce it, quite different from the 
situation confronted in this case. 
Further pursuing the inquiry as to whether these 
contracts between plaintiff USU and the defendant 
brokers should be regarded as utterly illegal and void, 
as compared to being simply not authorized by law, it 
seems helpful to figuratively "try the shoe on the other 
foot." Suppose in an instance where a broker had 
made a substantial stock purchase at USU's request 
and held it for a few months, there had been an 
increase in value with a profit of say $100,000, and 
that the broker had refused to remit and defended on 
the ground that the contract was completely void. The 
rejection of that contention seems so obviously just as 
to hardly require stating. 
A decision which recognized that there are 
sometimes circumstances where the interests of justice 
demand allowing the doctrine of estoppel to be 
asserted against the government was issued over 100 
years ago by the United States Supreme Court in 
Hackett v. City of Ottawa. ([FN7]) There the city 
officials had represented that bonds were issued for a 
lawful purpose and issued them under the city's seal, 
but it was later determined that their issuance had not 
been in accordance with lawful authority. It was held 
that because such obvious unfairness would otherwise 
result to purchasers of the bonds, the city was 
estopped from asserting that they had been unlawfully 
issued and were void. 
Another case which we regard as helpful and 
representing sound reasoning on this subject is that of 
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch. ([FN8]) After 
reviewing the case law, the court stated that estoppel 
should be allowed as a defense against the government 
where to do otherwise would work a serious injustice, 
and the public interest would not be unduly damaged 
by the interposition of that defense. In its discussion, 
the court engaged in what has been referred to as a 
"balancing of equities" test and concluded that under 
the facts of that case a grave injustice would result if 
the government were not held responsible for the 
information it had given the Ranch and which the 
latter had relied on; and that under the circumstances 
there would be no serious adverse effect either on 
public policy or the interest of the government by 
permitting the Ranch partners to retain the funds they 
had received. 
*720 In the later case of United States v. Wharton, 
([FN9]) the court reiterated the standard set forth in 
Lazy FC Ranch. The defendants asserted the 
government was estopped by the affirmative 
misconduct on the part of government officials who 
gave them incorrect information. The court noted the 
precaution that not every form of official 
misinformation would be sufficient to estop the 
government, but where advice given was so closely 
related to basic fairness and the decision-making 
process, the government should be estopped from 
disavowing the representation made because to do so 
would work a serious injustice on the defendant and 
the interest of the public would not be unduly 
threatened or damaged. 
Our own Court has similarly long since taken its 
position in accord with the doctrine just discussed, of 
looking through the rigidity of a general rule to see 
and apply an exception where it is plain that the 
interests of justice so require. In the case of Wall v. 
Salt Lake City, ([FN10]) the city by affirmative acts 
and representations had allowed the plaintiffs to take 
possession of property which was difficult for the city 
to utilize as a street. In reliance thereon, the plaintiffs 
had possessed and cared for the property for over 20 
years. The Court held that the city was estopped from 
repudiating its representations and reclaiming the 
property. The ruling in the Wall case was restated 
with approval in the later case of Tooele City v. 
Elkington, ([FN 11]) though the Court was not 
persuaded that the factual requirements for invoking 
estoppel against the city were met. 
We have recently had occasion to confront another 
situation where egregious injury would result unless 
estoppel was applied against a governmental 
institution. In Celebrity Club v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, ([FN 12]) the plaintiff club had made 
large expenditures, relying on assurances of an 
official of the Liquor Commission, which this Court 
held could not be repudiated to the injury of the club. 
[4] [5] [6] We regard the authorities referred to above 
as well reasoned, with which our sense of justice is in 
harmony, and supportive of the well-recognized policy 
of the law as earlier set forth herein, to the effect that 
the rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel 
against the government is sound and generally should 
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be applied, except only in appropriate circumstances 
as hereinabove stated, where the interests of justice 
mandate an exception to that general rule. ([FN 13]) 
In cases where such an issue arises, the critical 
inquiry is whether it appears that the facts may be 
found with such certainty, and the injustice to be 
suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the 
exception. And in case there is doubt on such 
matters, it should be resolved in favor of permitting 
the party to have a trial of the issue, as opposed to 
summary rejection thereof. ([FN 14]) Whether 
injustice of that serious character would be the result 
in this case can only be determined on the facts which 
may be found from the evidence to be presented on 
the issues in dispute. 
Taking the brokers' averments and representations 
as true, we cannot conclude with assurance that there 
is no reasonable probability that they can meet the test 
stated herein. It is therefore our conclusion that it 
was improper to adjudge them liable as a *721 
matter of law. In relation to the issues raised in this 
case, it is deemed desirable and necessary that an 
opportunity be afforded the defendant brokers and the 
plaintiff USU to present such evidence as they desire 
in support of their respective contentions as to the 
propriety of their conduct, and that a trier of facts 
make a determination thereon. 
The second issue of major importance is the 
defendant brokers' attack on the trial court's dismissal 
of their third-party complaints for indemnification 
from members of the Institutional Council for any 
damages that may be assessed against the brokers. 
We first note that the brokers state in their brief that 
they are not appealing from the dismissal of their 
third-party actions against the Institutional Council as 
an entity, but appeal only the dismissal as to the 
individuals involved. 
The proposition upon which the brokers base their 
third-party complaints is that if an agent (themselves) 
is held liable for actions in which he is innocent, and 
which his principal (USU) directed him to commit, 
the principal must reimburse the agent for the 
damages incurred. ([FN15]) Their averments are that 
the Council members were all well educated, 
experienced and sophisticated in such matters; that as 
trustees of a public trust they were charged with 
knowledge as to the extent of their authority and with 
a high degree of responsibility in discharging their 
duties; and that in case of any uncertainty they had 
ready and free access to the advice of the Attorney 
General; but that they nevertheless negligently failed 
in their duty and made the representations hereinabove 
set forth to the broker-dealers, who aver that they 
were innocent agents in the transactions. This 
position might have merit if they had not been dealing 
with a governmental institution and public officials. 
[7] [8] The generally recognized doctrine of law is 
that public officials are protected by a qualified 
immunity from suits growing out of the performance 
of lawfully authorized discretionary duties, so long as 
they are acting in good faith and are not guilty of any 
willful or intentional wrongdoing. ([FN 16]) The 
underlying reasons for this are that such protection is 
in accord with the interests of justice; is necessary as 
a matter of public policy in order not to deter persons 
of capability and integrity from accepting the 
responsibilities of public office; and that when they 
are so serving they should be free to exercise their 
judgment without fear of damage suits because 
someone thinks they made a mistake in judgment. 
Whenever confronted by such an issue, this Court has 
consistently aligned itself with the doctrine just stated 
and has ruled that when a public official is so acting in 
good faith in performing his discretionary duties he is 
not liable in damages simply because he may make a 
mistake in judgment. ([FN 17]) 
[9] The defendant brokers do not allege that the 
Council members acted in bad faith, nor that they 
committed any willful or intentional wrong. This is 
advisedly so because it is plainly apparent that there 
would be no basis for support on any such charge. In 
spite of errors in judgment, now so plainly revealed 
by hindsight, no one questions that the Council 
members acted in accordance with their then best 
judgment for the benefit of the institution they served, 
with little other advantage to themselves than the 
satisfaction of having rendered a worthwhile public 
service. 
On the basis of what has been stated above, it is our 
conclusion that the trial court was justified in 
dismissing the defendant *722. brokers' third-party 
complaints against the University officials and Council 
members; and that ruling is affirmed. 
[10] [11] The nonresident brokers (except Merrill 
Lynch, which has an office in Salt Lake City) also 
contend that no personal jurisdiction was acquired 
over them. There are a number of significant facts to 
be noted which have a bearing on that question. The 
brokers advertise in the public media soliciting 
business here; they conversed regularly with Mr. 
Catron, either calling him or accepting his collect 
calls about the stock transactions. Two banks in 
Logan were authorized to receive the stock certificates 
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sent by the brokers, to be exchanged for the proceeds 
of drafts payable to the brokers. Upon the purchase 
of stocks ordered by the plaintiff, the broker would 
send a confirmation of purchase slip, and monthly 
would send a statement of account. 
There is a fallacy in the brokers' argument in that 
they assume that because the banks that handled the 
plaintiffs funds and were designated by it to receive 
the stock certificates and pay drafts therefor, the 
banks were exclusively the agents of the plaintiff. It 
is not necessarily always true that a party acting as an 
agent in a transaction must be exclusively the agent of 
one party or the other. When he is requested and 
performs duties for each of the parties, with the 
knowledge and consent of both, he may very well be 
considered as an agent for each for the particular 
services he renders that principal. ([FN 18]) Insofar as 
the Logan banks performed duties for and by direction 
of the defendant brokers, they were acting as the 
brokers' agents. That being so, there is ample 
justification for the trial court's holding that they 
conducted substantial and continuous activities in this 
state sufficient to subject them to the jurisdiction of its 
court. ([FN19]) 
[12][13] Two of the defendants, Merrill Lynch and 
Bosworth-Sullivan, also contend that the trial court 
erred in denying their motions for change of venue 
from Cache County to Salt Lake County. Their 
position is that that is where the alleged causes of 
action arose because that is where they accepted the 
orders and executed the purchases of stock for 
plaintiff. However, we see no reason to disagree with 
the view adopted by the trial court that the 
transactions were actually consummated in the 
delivery of the stock and the payment therefor in the 
Logan banks; that this constituted the alleged 
wrongful acts; and that consequently the venue of the 
action was properly laid in Cache County. Moreover, 
assume that there may be some merit to these 
defendants' argument that venue should properly have 
been laid in Salt Lake County. When venue may 
properly lie in more than one county, the trial court 
has considerable latitude of discretion in acting on a 
motion for change; and his ruling will not be disturbed 
in the absence of a clear abuse thereof. ([FN20]) We 
are not persuaded that there was any error or abuse of 
discretion in denying defendants' motions. 
Other issues raised have been considered and are 
deemed to be without sufficient merit to warrant 
discussion. This case is remanded for further 
proceedings in conformity with the views expressed in 
this decision. No costs awarded. 
HALL, C. J., STEWART and HOWE, JJ., and 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, District Judge, concur. 
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., do not participate 
herein. 
(FN1.) Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance Co., 20 Utah 
2d 156, 434 P.2d 758 (1967). 
(FN2.) Breitling Bros. v. Utah Golden Spikers, Inc., 
Utah, 597 P.2d 869 (1979). 
(FN3.) Cf. Lord Mansfield's dictum: Let justice be 
done, though the heavens fall. 
(FN4.) That courts are increasingly applying this 
exception, consistent with the trend toward holding 
government and its agencies more responsible for 
their actions. See Davis, Administrative Law of the 
Seventies, s 17.01, and cases therein cited; Berger, 
Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U.Chi.L.Rev. 
680, 686 (1954); Newman, Should Official Advice 
Be Reliable?-Proposals as to Estoppel and Related 
Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 Colum.L.Rev. 
374 (1953). A recent decision of this Court 
indicating agreement with the trend toward 
narrowing governmental protection is Standiford v. 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 605 P.2d 1230 (1980). 
(FN5.) Nestman v. South Davis County Water 
Improvement Dist., 16 Utah 2d 198, 201, 398 P.2d 
203, 205 (1965). Accord, Gordon v. Provo City, 15 
Utah 2d 287, 288-89, 391 P.2d 430 (1964). 
*722_ (FN6.) Utah, 544 P.2d 887 (1975). 
(FN7.) 99 U.S. 86, 25 L.Ed. 363 (1878). 
(FN8.) 481 F.2d 985 (1973). 
(FN9.) 514 F.2d 406 (1975). 
(FN10.) 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766 (1917). 
(FN11.) 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941). 
(FN12.) 602 P.2d 689 (1979). 
(FN 13.) Any apprehension about adverse effects on 
the public interest of recognizing the defense of 
estoppel is minimized here because after the public 
notoriety concerning the controversy here involved, 
our state legislature more clearly delineated the 
power of the University to invest in securities. See 
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s 51-7-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1974 Supp. s 12.208. 
(FN14.) Sec. 11, Art. I, Utah Const, assures access 
to the courts for the protection of rights and the 
redress of wrongs; therefore, summary judgment, 
which denies the opportunity of trial, should be 
granted only when it clearly appears that there is no 
reasonable probability the party moved against could 
prevail. See Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and 
Guar. Ins. Under., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 
(1965), and authorities therein cited. 
(FN 15.) Citing Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 
P. 512 (1903). 
(FN16.) See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 
575, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1341, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959); 
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, at 343-344 (1973). 
Eminent authorities in accord, Prosser, The Law of 
Torts, s 132; 4 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, 
(FN 17.) Anderson v. Granite School District, 17 
Utah 2d 405, 413 P.2d 597 (1966); Hjorth v. 
Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952); 
Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 
(1968). 
(FN18.) See Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., Utah, 
530 P.2d 815 (1974), and authorities therein cited; 3 
AmJur.2d Agency, s 234 (1962). 
(FN19.) Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, Utah, 608 
P.2d 244; Brown v. Carness Corp., 611 P.2d 378; 
Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., Utah, 610 P.2d 
1307. 
(FN20.) Chamblee v. Stocks, 9 Utah 2d 342, 344 
P.2d 980 (1959). 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DALE WHEELER, ) 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ) 
MARK R. MCPHERSON, and ; 
KANE COUNTY SHERIFFS ; 
DEPARTMENT, ; 
Defendants. ] 
1 ORDER CHANGING VENUE 
) Civil No. 990502485 
) Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which was 
supported a memorandum of points and authorities. Plaintiff responded with an opposing 
memorandum, and Defendants then filed a reply memorandum. 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court in the belief that the acts and omissions of 
which he complains occurred in Washington County. Plaintiff now believes those acts and 
omissions occurred in Kane County. Defendant moves for dismissal of the Complaint on the 
basis of Rule 12 (b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-17, 
which provides, in part: 
Actions against a county may be brought in the county in which 
the claim arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave 
granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any 
county contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be 
granted ex parte. 
Under this statute, proper venue of this action is clearly in Kane County, not Washington 
County, and any transfer from Kane County to Washington County or any other county 
contiguous with Kane County must be made by a district court judge in Kane County. To 
this extent, Defendants are entirely correct. 
Rule 12 (b)(3) only provides, however, that a defense of improper venue "may at the 
option of the pleader be made by motion" before filing a responsive pleading. It does not 
necessarily provide for dismissal of a complaint for improper venue. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
13-8 provides that an action which is commenced in an improper venue may still be tried 
there unless "the defendant at the time he answers or otherwise appears files a motion, in 
writing, that the trial be had in the proper county." On the basis of this statute, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "objection to venue is made by motion for change of place of 
trial rather than by motion to dismissal [sic; may be error in "Utah Law on Disc"]." Cannon 
v. Tuft. 3 Utah 2d 410, 285 P.2d 843, (Utah 1955). 
Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss is not the correct procedure for 
challenging venue, and the motion should be denied on that basis. Doing so will leave the 
case in a clearly improper venue under Section 63-30-17, however, at least until the district 
court of Kane County considers whether to change venue to a contiguous county.1 
*Even though Section 78-13-8 allows a case to proceed in an improper venue in the absence of a 
timely motion to change venue, Section 63-30-17 appears to contradict that idea and require a case to be 
filed and considered in the proper venue. This Court assumes that the specific venue provisions of Section 
63-30-17 would supercede the general venue provisions of Section 78-13-8. 
2 
While Defendants' motion to dismiss cannot be granted, the Court will order, sua 
sponte, that venue be changed, for the following reasons: 
a. Defendants have raised the issue of improper venue in a timely manner, but by 
a defective procedure. 
b. This Court does not wish to encourage or entertain quibbles of the sort 
involved in Cannon v. Tuft, as to whether Defendants' filing of the wrong 
motion foreclosed them from filing a proper motion to change venue. 
c. Section 63-30-17 requires that this case begin in Kane County, in which the 
claim arose.2 
Consequently, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that venue of this action be changed to 
the Sixth District Court for Kane County. 
Dated this A ^ day of August, 2000. 
JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM 
defendants also note that Kane County may be the proper defendant, rather than the named 
Defendants. If Defendants are correct, that would give another basis for venue in Kane County. That 
issue, and the issue of the adequacy of the summonses, may be resolved after transfer to the proper venue. 
3 
Certificate of Mailing or Hand Delivery 
I hereby certify that on this 3 day of £burt,, 2000,1 provided true and correct 
copies of the foregoing ORDER to each of the attorneys named below by placing a copy in 
the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Ronald E. Dalby 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salk Lake City, Utah 84107 
John Warren May 
Attorney for Defendants 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT 
v# 
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*D 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No 3118) 
KIMBERLY D. WASHBURN (Bar No. 6681) 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
• - • i, 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
DALE WHEELER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK R. McPHERSON and KANE 
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No 000600048 
Judge David L Mower 
The above captioned matter came before the Court on the motion of the Defendants' to 
dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint. The Court, having considered the submissions of the parties, the 
file herein and good cause otherwise appearing, hereby enters the following Order: 
The Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed. 
DATED this 2 - day of *£&& 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
2As_ 
JLE DAVID L. MOWER 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
Please take notice that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, that this proposed ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS will be adopted by the Court unless you file an objection in writing within five (5) days 
from the date of service of this Notice. 
5^ DATED this _^ day of January, 2001. 
STIRB A & HATHAWAY 
\A .W^—-
snburn Kimberly E^Was! 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s 5 _ _ day of January, 2001,1 caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, 
by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Ronald E. Dalby 
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & 
DALBY, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
() Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
\faiA 
r f 
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DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (435) 644-2458 Fax: (435) 644-2052 
DALE WHEELER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK R. MCPHERSON, an individual, and 
KANE COUNTY SHERIFF'S 
DEPARTMENT. 
Defendant. 
COURT'S DECISION 
Case No. 000600048 
Assigned Judge: David L. Mower 
Defendants have made a motion to dismiss. Although an Answer has been filed, it will 
be disregarded because, insofar as any motion to dismiss is concerned, the Complaint is 
presumed to be true. 
The basis of the motion is that the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed. More 
specifically, the defendants claim (1) that a particular notice is a prerequisite to the filing of the 
complaint, (2) that the notice was not given, and (3) that therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to 
proceed. 
Notice is a prerequisite. 
Any person having a claim ... shall file a written notice .... Section 
63-30-11(2), Utah Code. 
There is a deadline for giving notice. 
A claim ... is barred unless notice of claim is filed ... within one 
year after the claim arises .... Section 63-30-13, Utah Code. 
COURTS DECISION, Case number 000600048, Page -2-
There is a required method for giving notice. 
The notice of claim shall be ... directed and delivered ... to the 
county clerk .... Section 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(i)(B), Utaih Code. 
The claim arose on September 27, 1998. Complaint, paragraph 3. 
The time period "within one year" is to be computed according to Rule 6, Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure. The strict computation does not appear to be an issue here, so I will assume 
it to be September 27, 1999. 
There was no notice directed and delivered to the county clerk by September 27,1999. 
Affidavit of Karla Johnson, Kane County Clerk. 
I conclude that no proper notice was given and that the "bar" referred to in section 63-30-
13 was triggered. 
The phrase "a claim is barred" means the same as "the Court has no jurisdiction to 
proceed". 
The complaint makes no claims against Mr. McPherson as an individual. In fact, all the 
claims in the complaint against him are for actions done while acting as a law enforcement 
officer of Kane County. The specific references to him are as follows: 
(A) ... a sheriffs deputy ... (complaint, paragraph 3); 
(B) ... to chase a speeding ... vehicle (complaint, paragraph 3); 
(C) ... the deputy ... (complaint, paragraph 3); 
(D) ... the Defendants are a law enforcement agency and officer (complaint, paragraph 
4); 
(E) Defendant was in the scope and course of his duty .... (complaint, paragraph 4). 
COURT'S DECISION, Case number 000600048, Page -3-
DECISION 
The Plaintiff is barred from pursuing his complaint for failure to give the required notice. 
The motion to dismiss should be granted. Mr. Stirba or Mr. Guelker are to prepare an 
appropriate order implementing this decision and to submit it for execution by following the 
procedure set forth in Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration. 
Dated this ' " day of November, 2000. 
David L. Mower 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
VV day of November 2000, a copy of the COURTS 
each of the follmviflsrb^Uhemethod indicated: (Mail, in Per^ottfFax) 
Jim R. Scarth 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George,-*Ff 84770 
M 
ION was sent to 
Addressee 
Rebecca Wal 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-081 
Method 
m 
y
*^\_^juiA'i~-^\^ _ 
Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the S%Ta' day o f December, 2000 a copy of the COURT'S DECISION was sent to 
each of the following by the method indicated: (Mail, in Person, Fax) 
Addressee Method Addressee Method 
Ronald E. Dalby [fA] 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Peter Sirba 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
W 
VUs&J$<6 
Clerk 
